Mr David Eldon:
Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, I stand before you today with a confession to make.
It relates to something that I did recently.
Exactly one month ago, I delivered a speech to another American audience. It was a gathering of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong. I talked about Hong Kong's changing role. And about how Hong Kong can compete as it becomes increasingly easier for foreign companies to do business in China.
On that day in March, I made several suggestions. One of which was that when travelling overseas, government officials and business people from Hong Kong should spend more time selling Hong Kong to the sceptics. And less time speaking to the converted.
Consequently I am here today, in front of a decidedly Hong Kong-friendly crowd, in direct violation of my own advice. That said, I plan to redeem myself by not devoting too much time talking about Hong Kong - a topic that is well known to this audience. Rather I intend to concentrate on the less known. In particular, the implications of China's entry into the WTO. The implications for Hong Kong and the implications for foreign companies.
In doing so, I am going to focus my talk on three distinct areas of knowledge:
what we know we know;
what we know we do not know; and
what we do not know we know.
Common knowledge
First, what we know we know. We know that China means different things to different people.
To overseas manufacturing firms or trading companies it is "the land of a billion buyers of shoes, cars and computers." To foreign companies already in China it is a place that warrants expansion. In fact, a recent survey found that nine out every 10 foreign companies operating in China plan to expand their investment in the next three years. To foreign financial institutions - particularly those interested in the provision of wealth management services - China is a market with enormous potential. After all it is a country with the highest rate of savings in the world. A country where reportedly more than 80 per cent of the bank deposits are held in 20 per cent of the accounts. To my Bank it is our birthplace. To your President it is a 'strategic competitor.'
Another thing we know we know and this audience in particular knows is that China's entry into the WTO means the role of Hong Kong will inevitably change.
Hong Kong was once the only gateway to the Mainland market. A vital link between East and West. Between developed and less-developed nations. Between capitalist and reforming economies. Between China and everywhere else. Today, Hong Kong no longer holds this privileged position. The reality is that Hong Kong hasn't held it for quite some time. Long before the ink was dry on China's WTO agreement, companies were choosing to bypass Hong Kong and go directly to Beijing, Shanghai and elsewhere in the Mainland. Of course, a significant number of companies were also still coming to Hong Kong to take advantage of the city's close geographic, economic, political and cultural ties to the Mainland. And as you are aware they continue to come.
We also know that China is in the midst of two transitions at one time: from a command to a market economy and from a rural to an urban society. And we know that the country faces a number of challenges: allocating incoming capital effectively; reforming state-owned enterprises; creating more jobs; spreading wealth more evenly; reducing bureaucracy; and eliminating corruption. And now, living up to the commitments and the expectations of WTO membership can be added to this list.
Finally, we know that China has changed a great deal in a relatively short period of time. Thirty years ago US President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger made a historic journey to China. Their seven-day trip concluded with the signing of the Shanghai Communiqu¨| inside the Grand Hall of the Jinjiang Hotel in Shanghai. A couple of weeks ago, Dr Kissinger returned to the Jinjiang to deliver a speech commemorating the events of 1972.
I do not know if Dr Kissinger took the time to explore the surrounding area. If he did, he would have possibly seen the nearby theatre that regularly plays the latest offering from Hollywood. He would have probably come across the American fast food outlets or the Italian designer clothing store just down the block. Before crossing the street, he would have likely had to wait for a line of Japanese cars to pass and perhaps even the bus emblazoned with a larger-than-life Winnie the Pooh. And if he stayed out late enough, he would have undoubtedly been able to stroll back to the hotel under the colorful neon lights advertising German cellular phones. In short, he would have definitely seen a very different China today than the one he saw 30 years ago.
Existing uncertainties
The second area I want to focus on is what we know we do not know. In other words, the uncertainties related to the further opening of China's market.
Clearly, we do not know exactly how numerous industries will evolve. And it is a lack of advanced knowledge that is prompting much speculation. In the area of financial services for example, some predict that many of China's domestic banks will have a limited life span once the market is fully opened up in five years time.
Personally, I do not share this view. I think they will be very strong competitors. Partly because they are in the advantageous position of knowing the marketplace. Partly because they have national networks that are impossible - not to mention impractical - to match. And partly because they have a strong base of customers and are becoming increasingly modern. Consider the Mainland's largest bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. It recently announced that it has more than 10,000 corporates and 1.8 million individuals using its online banking services. But the main reason I think domestic banks in China will be strong competitors: they are very fast learners.
Another thing we know we do not know - and this specifically relates to Hong Kong - is the indirect benefits that will flow from a more open market in China.
For example, if mainland investors are allowed to invest their foreign exchange holdings in Hong Kong, the SAR's stock market would clearly benefit. Hong Kong's position as a fund raising centre for Mainland companies would also be enhanced. We know this idea is under consideration. We also know we do not know when it may happen.
Likewise, we know that if banks in Hong Kong are permitted to accept RMB deposits, the SAR's status as an international financial centre and as the premier regional financial centre will be enhanced even further. Once again we know this idea is being considered, but we do not know when it may happen.
A third unknown - and one that has been getting considerable attention recently - is the accuracy of some of China's statistics. As you are undoubtedly aware, questions have been raised about certain numbers. Even senior Mainland officials concede that some data is flawed. For example, the head of the Central Bank recently confirmed that levels of non-performing loans at China's big state banks are in fact higher than official estimates. However, numbers only tell part of any story. Whether one agrees with official estimates of GDP growth or not, no one can deny that China is developing rapidly. At least not anyone who visits China on a regular basis.
Finally, we know that we do not know how China will change the WTO. What role will the country play in shaping future trade talks? Will China's presence prompt other members to address the concerns of developing nations more readily? And how will another large player at the table affect overall group dynamics?
One thing that is clear: the WTO is much more of a global body now than it was prior to China's entry. Simply put, no organization can rightly call itself global if it does not include the world's most populous nation.
Forgotten knowledge
The third area I want to discuss is what we do not know we know. A translation of which might be the things we already know but often overlook or outright forget.
For example, when it comes to Hong Kong, some people seem to think the SAR will be surpassed. Replaced if you will. This doomsday group seems to forget the fact that many of Hong Kong's infrastructural and institutional attributes - including its free-market philosophy, the rule of law and free flow of capital - are attributes which are impossible for any other city in China to replicate any time soon
In terms of China itself, some executives of some companies still drool over the prospects of selling their goods or services to a single market of 1.3 billion people. They seem to overlook or forget the fact that the Mainland market includes 23 provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities directly under the central government, five special economic zones, 14 open coastal and border cities, 15 export processing areas, 14 bonded zones, some 30 provincial-level economic and technological development zones and more than 50 new and high-technology development zones. At least at last count.
And while the preferential policies of some of these special zones will gradually disappear under WTO, the complexities of doing business in such a vast market will not. A fact which - I submit - should subdue any remaining overactive salivary glands.
Finally, there are some who seem to think that China's entry into the WTO will provide an avenue to solve all future trade disputes. They seem to forget that the WTO is often used more as a weapon for protectionism than as a shield for open markets.
Personally, I think China will work very hard to live up to its commitments and to operate within the rules of the WTO. And if they are smart - and I think they are - they will also seek ways to exploit the rules to the benefit of their own industries. In other words they will act much like every other country on the WTO membership list.
Applying one's knowledge
Against this backdrop of knowledge - both the known and the unknown - it is clear that some foreign companies are itching to get access to the Mainland market.
I recall reading the comments of one executive who said his two most important questions about China are "which month" and "which day" his company will get the necessary approvals. He went on to say: "If I get four questions, then the third question would be at which hour, and the fourth at which minute we will get our license."
And just so you know, you can all breathe easier, he was not from an American company!
The reality is that anyone focused solely on the short-term gains or anyone who is prone to impatience is destined to be disappointed. China is like any developing market. It takes time to build a business. Profits cannot be made overnight. It is not a place for foreign companies to improve next quarter's earnings.
HSBC for its part is not a typical foreign company in the Mainland. As I mentioned earlier, our roots are in China. We have had a continuous presence in the Mainland for more than 135 years. Our name is also well known. For example, one survey done in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou found that we were by far the most-recognised foreign financial institution. Close to 90 per cent of the respondents said they were familiar with the name HSBC. The next closest foreign bank scored in the low 70s.
Despite this history and this recognition, we know that we will not automatically benefit from the further opening of China's financial services sector under WTO. We know that we will have to work very hard to maintain our position. And we are.
We have moved our China headquarters to Pudong in Shanghai. We have signed RMB remittance pacts with all four of the big state banks and we continue to seek ways to enhance our co-operation with domestic banks. On the people side, localisation remains a top priority. Already, nine out of every 10 of our Mainland staff are hired locally.
Recently we along with a few other foreign banks were given permission to offer foreign currency services to mainland Chinese citizens and corporations in select cities. In HSBC's case, we are allowed to offer such services in three cities: Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.
Last December we also purchased an 8 per cent equity stake in the Bank of Shanghai. In addition to becoming the first foreign commercial bank to be allowed to invest in a domestic Chinese bank, we also became - in effect - partners with the Shanghai Municipal Government, the major shareholder in the bank. For us, it was a high and historic note on which to end the year 2001.
Just as an aside, not everyone seems to agree that our purchase of a strategic stake in the Bank of Shanghai was all that momentous.
For example, in subsequent articles heralding the precedent-setting deal, one foreign banker was quoted as saying: "Most of the banks have been offering 15 per cent to the market. If you get 15 per cent you don't get anything." Another foreign banker said that our purchase was "only symbolic" and "without any actual benefits." He also said that his bank had no interest in acquiring a minority stake in any Mainland financial institution
I will not tell you who made these rather pessimistic comments, if for no other reason than to help both individuals 'save face' should their banks later decide to reconsider. What I will say is that both work for our so-called 'strategic competitors'. Consequently, I am inclined to think they were suffering from a touch of fermented fruit syndrome. Otherwise known as a case of sour grapes!
Conclusion
I have spent much of my time this morning talking about the implications of an agreement which became official on the 11th of December 2001. I also briefly mentioned another history-making agreement that was signed on the 28th of February 1972.
In fact, there are a number of striking similarities between China's entry into the WTO and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqu¨|.
Both agreements changed the world significantly. Both agreements set the stage for increased contact . . . economic and otherwise. And both agreements also came after some considerable negotiation.
At the outset of the 1972 talks, Dr Kissinger reportedly told his Chinese hosts: "The good thing about our relationship is that we want nothing from each other."
Chairman Mao is said to have promptly disagreed, noting: "If I had wanted nothing from you, I wouldn't have invited you. And if you wanted nothing from me, you shouldn't have come."
Similar sentiments apply to the WTO agreement. If China did not have something to gain, it would not have joined the WTO. Nor would it have made, as some observers suggest, commitments that are far more reaching than any previous membership applicant has. Likewise, foreign companies would not be flocking to and expanding their operations in China if they thought there was nothing to gain. Nor if they thought there were no profits to be made.
In closing, let me make one final observation about Hong Kong and the impact of China's entry into the WTO.
I know and I think all of you would agree that Hong Kong is well positioned to play a significant role in the post-entry period. And I know that I know the people of Hong Kong have the capacity and the capability to respond to new challenges. Simply put, I know that if New York is the city that never sleeps, then Hong Kong is the city that never stagnates.
Thank you.
中國與WTO：十五年的渴望
艾爾敦先生:
先生們，女士們，早上好！
今天我站在這里，要向大家坦白。
是關(guān)于最近我說過的一些話。
一個(gè)月前，我向另一些美國聽眾發(fā)表了講話。那是在香港的美國商會(huì)的一次聚會(huì)上。我談到香港的角色正在發(fā)生變化?，F(xiàn)在外國公司在中國開展業(yè)務(wù)越來越容易， 所以我也談到了在這種情況下香港怎樣進(jìn)行競爭。
就在那一天，也就是在三月份，我提出了幾點(diǎn)建議。其中一點(diǎn)是香港的政府官員和商業(yè)人員在去海外時(shí)應(yīng)該多花些時(shí)間向那些對(duì)香港持懷疑態(tài)度的人宣傳香港，而不要花太多時(shí)間和對(duì)香港友好的人談?wù)撓愀邸?BR> 所以我今天會(huì)站在這里，站在一群對(duì)香港極為友好的人面前，直截了當(dāng)?shù)剡`背自己提出的建議。既然這么說，我打算對(duì)自己說過的話作出補(bǔ)償，不用太多的時(shí)間談?wù)撓愀?- 這個(gè)話題對(duì)于今天的聽眾來說已經(jīng)非常熟悉了。我想多談一些大家不太熟悉的東西。尤其是中國加入WTO所產(chǎn)生的影響，對(duì)香港的影響，還有對(duì)外國公司的影響。
這樣，我準(zhǔn)備集中談?wù)撊糠值膬?nèi)容:
我們知道自己已經(jīng)了解的事;
我們知道自己還沒有了解的事; 還有
我們不知道自己已經(jīng)了解的事
眾所周知的內(nèi)容
首先是我們知道自己已經(jīng)了解的事。我們知道中國對(duì)于不同的人來說意味著不同的東西。
對(duì)于海外的制造商和貿(mào)易公司來說，中國是"有著十多億購買鞋子、汽車和電腦的消費(fèi)者的國家"。 對(duì)于已經(jīng)在中國的外國公司來說，在這里擴(kuò)展業(yè)務(wù)是理所當(dāng)然的。事實(shí)上，最近的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查表明，在中國運(yùn)作的每十家外國公司中有九家計(jì)劃在未來三年里擴(kuò)大投資。對(duì)于外資的金融機(jī)構(gòu)來說 - 尤其是那些對(duì)提供財(cái)富管理服務(wù)感興趣的外資金融機(jī)構(gòu)來說 - 中國是一個(gè)有著巨大潛力的市場。畢竟這是一個(gè)有著全世界存款率的國家。根據(jù)報(bào)道，在中國超過80%的銀行存款存在20%的賬戶之中。對(duì)于我的銀行 - 匯豐銀行 - 來說，中國是我們的誕生地。對(duì)于各位的總統(tǒng)來說，中國是 '戰(zhàn)略性的競爭對(duì)手'。
另一件我們知道自己已經(jīng)了解的事，也是在座的各位聽眾了解的事，就是中國加入WTO意味著香港的角色肯定會(huì)發(fā)生變化。
香港一度曾經(jīng)是進(jìn)入中國內(nèi)地市場的通道。它是一條至關(guān)重要的紐帶，聯(lián)系著東西方，聯(lián)系著發(fā)達(dá)國家和欠發(fā)達(dá)的國家，聯(lián)系著資本主義經(jīng)濟(jì)和改革之中的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，也聯(lián)系著中國和世界各地。今天，香港已經(jīng)不再擁有這一特殊地位。事實(shí)上，香港失去這一地位已經(jīng)有一段時(shí)間了。在中國加入WTO之前，各公司早就選擇繞過香港，直接進(jìn)入北京，上海和中國內(nèi)地的其他地方。當(dāng)然，也有大量公司還是到香港來，以利用這座城市與中國內(nèi)地在地理，經(jīng)濟(jì)，政治和文化方面的緊密聯(lián)系。大家也都看到，還有公司陸續(xù)到來。
我們也知道中國正同時(shí)處于兩種轉(zhuǎn)變之中：從計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)到市場經(jīng)濟(jì)，從農(nóng)業(yè)到都市社會(huì)。我們也知道這個(gè)國家正面臨著一系列的挑戰(zhàn)：有效分配涌入的資金；改革國有企業(yè)；創(chuàng)造更多的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)；更平均地分配財(cái)富；減少官僚作風(fēng)；還有杜絕腐敗?，F(xiàn)在，還可以加上一條：達(dá)到WTO成員國的承諾和期望。
最后，我們知道中國在相對(duì)較短的時(shí)間里發(fā)生了巨大的變化。三十年前美國總統(tǒng)尼克松和他的國家安全事務(wù)助理基辛格對(duì)中國進(jìn)行了一次具有歷史意義的訪問。他們?yōu)槠谄咛斓脑L問的最后一項(xiàng)內(nèi)容是在上海的錦江飯店小禮堂簽訂上海公報(bào)。就在幾星期前，基辛格博士又來到錦江飯店發(fā)表講話，紀(jì)念1972年的這一事件。
我不知道基辛格博士是否花時(shí)間去周圍的地方看過。如果他這么做了，他可能會(huì)看到附近的一家電*，這家電*經(jīng)常上映最新的好萊塢大片。沿著大街走，他可能會(huì)見到美式的快餐店或是意大利款式的服裝店。在過馬路之前，他很有可能要等著一長排日本汽車開過，甚至是畫著非常顯眼的小熊維尼圖案的公共汽車。如果他在外面逗留到很晚，他一定會(huì)在做著德國移動(dòng)電話廣告的霓虹燈下漫步回到賓館?？偠灾?，他現(xiàn)在一定會(huì)看到與三十年前完全不同的一個(gè)中國。
存在的不確定因素
我想說的第二部分是我們知道自己不了解的東西。換句話說，就是有關(guān)中國市場進(jìn)一步開放的不確定因素。
很明顯，我們不知道到底這么多行業(yè)會(huì)怎樣發(fā)展。由于對(duì)事情缺乏深入的了解而導(dǎo)致許多揣測。比如，在金融服務(wù)這一方面，有一些人預(yù)測，一旦市場在五年后完全開放，許多中資銀行就會(huì)陸續(xù)關(guān)門。
我個(gè)人不同意這種看法。我認(rèn)為這些中資銀行將會(huì)是非常強(qiáng)勁的競爭對(duì)手。這一部分是因?yàn)檫@些銀行了解市場，處于有利地位。另一部分原因是它們有遍布全國的網(wǎng)絡(luò)， 這一點(diǎn)是根本無法匹敵的，更不用說趕上它們是不切實(shí)際的了。還有一部分原因是它們擁有強(qiáng)大的客戶基礎(chǔ)，并且正在逐步走向現(xiàn)代化。比如中國內(nèi)地的銀行 - 中國工商銀行，最近這家銀行宣布有超過10,000家企業(yè)和一百八十萬的個(gè)人在使用其網(wǎng)上銀行的服務(wù)。但是我認(rèn)為中資銀行將成為強(qiáng)勁競爭對(duì)手的主要原因是：它們學(xué)習(xí)的速度非?？臁?BR> 另一件我們知道自己不了解的事和香港很有關(guān)系，就是從更加開放的中國市場獲得的間接利益。
比如，如果內(nèi)地的投資者獲準(zhǔn)在香港投資外幣股票，香港特別行政區(qū)的股票市場肯定會(huì)得到好處。香港作為內(nèi)地公司募集資金的中心，地位也會(huì)提高。我們知道這一想法正在考慮之中。我們也知道我們不了解這種情況什么時(shí)候會(huì)發(fā)生。
同樣地，我們知道如果香港的銀行獲準(zhǔn)接受人民幣存款，香港特別行政區(qū)作為國際金融中心和主要的地區(qū)性金融中心，它的地位將會(huì)更進(jìn)一步提高。我們也知道這一想法正在考慮之中，但是我們不知道這種情況什么時(shí)候會(huì)發(fā)生。
第三件我們不知道的事 - 這在最近也引起了相當(dāng)多的關(guān)注 - 就是某些關(guān)于中國的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字的準(zhǔn)確性。大家一定也知道，人們對(duì)某些數(shù)字提出了問題。甚至內(nèi)地的高級(jí)官員也承認(rèn)有一些數(shù)據(jù)存在錯(cuò)誤。比如，中國人民銀行行長最近證實(shí)，中國較大的國有銀行的不良貸款的程度事實(shí)上比官方估測的更高。但是，數(shù)字僅僅說明了問題的一部分。無論人們是否贊同官方對(duì)國民生產(chǎn)總值增長的估測，沒有人可以否認(rèn)中國正在飛速發(fā)展。至少?zèng)]有一個(gè)經(jīng)常去中國的人會(huì)否認(rèn)這一點(diǎn)。
最后，我們知道我們不了解中國會(huì)怎樣改變WTO。對(duì)于形成未來的貿(mào)易對(duì)話，中國會(huì)扮演什么樣的角色? 中國的加入是否會(huì)使其他成員國更愿意關(guān)注發(fā)展中國家的問題？桌邊又一個(gè)大玩家會(huì)對(duì)全組的動(dòng)力產(chǎn)生什么樣的影響？
有一點(diǎn)是非常清楚的：現(xiàn)在WTO比在中國加入之前更成為一個(gè)全球性的組織。 簡單地說，如果不包括這個(gè)全世界具有最多人口的國家，沒有一個(gè)組織可以問心無愧地說自己是全球性的組織。
被遺忘的內(nèi)容
我想討論的第三部分是我們不知道自己了解的事。也可以說是我們已經(jīng)知道，但經(jīng)常忽略或者完全忘記的東西。
比如，當(dāng)提到香港時(shí)，有些人似乎認(rèn)為香港特別行政區(qū)會(huì)被超越。如果你愿意，也可以說是替代。這些認(rèn)為到了世界末日的人似乎忘記了這一事實(shí)，許多香港的基礎(chǔ)結(jié)構(gòu)和機(jī)構(gòu)的特質(zhì) - 包括它的自由市場的思想，法治和資本的自由流動(dòng) - 是中國的任何其它城市在短時(shí)間內(nèi)都無法效仿的。
對(duì)于中國本身，某些公司的高級(jí)官員還是滿懷信心，希望可以把自己的商品或服務(wù)銷售給一個(gè)擁有13億消費(fèi)者的市場。 他們似乎忽略或者忘記了這一事實(shí)，中國內(nèi)地的市場包括23個(gè)省，5個(gè)自治區(qū)，4個(gè)直轄市，5個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)，14個(gè)沿海和沿邊開放城市，15個(gè)出口加工區(qū)，14個(gè)保稅區(qū)，大約30個(gè)省級(jí)經(jīng)濟(jì)和科技發(fā)展區(qū)， 還有超過50個(gè)新興的高科技發(fā)展區(qū)。至少最近的一次統(tǒng)計(jì)是這樣。
盡管在中國加入WTO 以后某些區(qū)域的優(yōu)惠政策會(huì)逐步取消，在這樣一個(gè)巨大的市場里開展業(yè)務(wù)的復(fù)雜性并不會(huì)消失。我承認(rèn)，這一事實(shí)會(huì)打消任何對(duì)這個(gè)市場過度樂觀的念頭。
最后，有一些人似乎認(rèn)為中國加入WTO 會(huì)為未來所有的貿(mào)易爭端提供解決的方法。 他們似乎忘記了WTO經(jīng)常更多地被用作保護(hù)貿(mào)易主義的武器，而不是用作開放市場的盾牌。
我個(gè)人認(rèn)為，中國將會(huì)非常努力地爭取完成它的承諾，并且遵守WTO的規(guī)則運(yùn)作。 如果中國人夠聰明 - 我認(rèn)為他們確實(shí)如此 - 他們也會(huì)為了本國行業(yè)的利益而尋找可以利用這些規(guī)則的方法。換句話說，他們的行動(dòng)會(huì)和WTO 成員國名單上的其它國家一樣。
應(yīng)用自己的知識(shí)
在這種認(rèn)知的基礎(chǔ)上 - 包括已知的和未知的 - 很明顯某些外國公司正渴望進(jìn)入中國內(nèi)地市場。
我記得讀到過一位高級(jí)官員的評(píng)論，他說他對(duì)于中國的兩個(gè)最重要的問題是"哪個(gè)月" 和"哪一天"他的公司可以得到必須的批準(zhǔn)。他又說："如果我有四個(gè)問題，那么第三個(gè)問題就是在哪一個(gè)小時(shí)，第四個(gè)問題則是哪一分鐘我們可以得到許可。"
盡管如此，大家可以松一口氣，因?yàn)樗皇莵碜杂诿绹荆?BR> 實(shí)際上，任何一個(gè)僅僅注重短期利益增長的人或是任何一個(gè)容易失去耐心的人都注定會(huì)失望。中國同任何發(fā)展中的市場都一樣。業(yè)務(wù)的建立需要一定的時(shí)間。利潤不可能很快就得到。中國這個(gè)地方不能使外國公司馬上提高下一季度的收入。
匯豐銀行在中國內(nèi)地并不是典型的外國公司。我剛才已經(jīng)提到過，我們的誕生地就在中國。我們在中國內(nèi)地的業(yè)務(wù)從未間斷，已超過了135年。我們的名字也廣為人知。比如，在北京，上海和廣州進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)，我們迄今為止是知名度的外資金融機(jī)構(gòu)。接近90%的受訪者說他們對(duì)匯豐這個(gè)名字很熟悉。排在第二位的外資銀行認(rèn)知率僅僅為70%。
盡管我們有悠久的歷史和比較高的知名度，我們知道自己不會(huì)從中國在加入WTO后進(jìn)一步開放的金融服務(wù)中自動(dòng)獲得利益。我們知道自己必須非常努力才能保持自己的地位。我們確實(shí)是在這么做。
我們已經(jīng)把中國業(yè)務(wù)總部遷到了上海浦東。我們已經(jīng)和所有四大國有銀行簽訂了人民幣匯款的合作條約，我們也繼續(xù)在尋找增強(qiáng)同中資銀行合作的途徑。在員工這方面，本地化一直是優(yōu)先考慮的問題。我們在內(nèi)地的員工已經(jīng)有90%是在本地招聘的。
最近我們和其他幾家外資銀行一起獲準(zhǔn)在部分城市向中國內(nèi)地的居民和企業(yè)提供外幣業(yè)務(wù)。我們匯豐獲準(zhǔn)在北京，上海和廣州這三個(gè)城市提供這項(xiàng)服務(wù)。
去年12月我們購入了上海銀行8%的股權(quán)。除了成為第一家獲準(zhǔn)投資中資銀行的外資商業(yè)銀行之外，我們也成為 - 事實(shí)上是如此 - 上海市政府的合作伙伴，因?yàn)樗巧虾ｃy行的主要股東。對(duì)于我們來說，這是為2001年的末尾添上的圓滿的一筆，具有很大的歷史意義。
結(jié)論
今天早上我已經(jīng)花了很多時(shí)間談?wù)搹?001年12月11日開始正式生效的WTO協(xié)議所帶來的影響。 我也簡單提到了另一個(gè)在1972年2月28日簽訂的具有歷史意義的協(xié)議。
事實(shí)上，在中國加入WTO 和中美上海公報(bào)的簽訂這兩者之間有許多相似的地方。
這兩個(gè)協(xié)議都顯著地改變了整個(gè)世界。兩個(gè)協(xié)議都標(biāo)志著逐步增加接觸的開始 . . . 包括經(jīng)濟(jì)的，還有其它方面的。并且兩個(gè)協(xié)議也都是在多次談判之后才達(dá)成。
據(jù)報(bào)道，在1972年對(duì)話的開始，基辛格博士就對(duì)中國的東道主說："我們之間的關(guān)系之中有一點(diǎn)很好，就是我們都不想從對(duì)方那里獲得什么。"
據(jù)說毛主席立刻反對(duì)說："如果我什么都不想從你們那里得到，我就不會(huì)邀請(qǐng)你們。如果你們什么都不想從我們這里得到，你們也就不會(huì)來了。"
同樣的感覺也適用于WTO 協(xié)議。如果中國不想獲得什么，就不會(huì)加入WTO。正如一些觀察家所指出的，它也就不會(huì)作出比任何以往的成員申請(qǐng)國影響更深遠(yuǎn)的承諾。同樣地，如果外國公司認(rèn)為什么都得不到，也就不會(huì)蜂擁到中國來擴(kuò)展他們的業(yè)務(wù)。如果他們認(rèn)為無利可圖，也不會(huì)這樣做。
在結(jié)束之前，我想最后再評(píng)述一下關(guān)于香港的情況和中國加入WTO 的影響。
我知道，而且我相信各位都同意這一點(diǎn)，香港處于有利的位置，可以在中國入世后扮演重要的角色。我也知道，我知道香港人有能力應(yīng)付新的挑戰(zhàn)。簡單地說，我知道如果紐約是不眠的城市，那么香港就是從不停滯的城市。
謝謝大家。
Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, I stand before you today with a confession to make.
It relates to something that I did recently.
Exactly one month ago, I delivered a speech to another American audience. It was a gathering of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong. I talked about Hong Kong's changing role. And about how Hong Kong can compete as it becomes increasingly easier for foreign companies to do business in China.
On that day in March, I made several suggestions. One of which was that when travelling overseas, government officials and business people from Hong Kong should spend more time selling Hong Kong to the sceptics. And less time speaking to the converted.
Consequently I am here today, in front of a decidedly Hong Kong-friendly crowd, in direct violation of my own advice. That said, I plan to redeem myself by not devoting too much time talking about Hong Kong - a topic that is well known to this audience. Rather I intend to concentrate on the less known. In particular, the implications of China's entry into the WTO. The implications for Hong Kong and the implications for foreign companies.
In doing so, I am going to focus my talk on three distinct areas of knowledge:
what we know we know;
what we know we do not know; and
what we do not know we know.
Common knowledge
First, what we know we know. We know that China means different things to different people.
To overseas manufacturing firms or trading companies it is "the land of a billion buyers of shoes, cars and computers." To foreign companies already in China it is a place that warrants expansion. In fact, a recent survey found that nine out every 10 foreign companies operating in China plan to expand their investment in the next three years. To foreign financial institutions - particularly those interested in the provision of wealth management services - China is a market with enormous potential. After all it is a country with the highest rate of savings in the world. A country where reportedly more than 80 per cent of the bank deposits are held in 20 per cent of the accounts. To my Bank it is our birthplace. To your President it is a 'strategic competitor.'
Another thing we know we know and this audience in particular knows is that China's entry into the WTO means the role of Hong Kong will inevitably change.
Hong Kong was once the only gateway to the Mainland market. A vital link between East and West. Between developed and less-developed nations. Between capitalist and reforming economies. Between China and everywhere else. Today, Hong Kong no longer holds this privileged position. The reality is that Hong Kong hasn't held it for quite some time. Long before the ink was dry on China's WTO agreement, companies were choosing to bypass Hong Kong and go directly to Beijing, Shanghai and elsewhere in the Mainland. Of course, a significant number of companies were also still coming to Hong Kong to take advantage of the city's close geographic, economic, political and cultural ties to the Mainland. And as you are aware they continue to come.
We also know that China is in the midst of two transitions at one time: from a command to a market economy and from a rural to an urban society. And we know that the country faces a number of challenges: allocating incoming capital effectively; reforming state-owned enterprises; creating more jobs; spreading wealth more evenly; reducing bureaucracy; and eliminating corruption. And now, living up to the commitments and the expectations of WTO membership can be added to this list.
Finally, we know that China has changed a great deal in a relatively short period of time. Thirty years ago US President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger made a historic journey to China. Their seven-day trip concluded with the signing of the Shanghai Communiqu¨| inside the Grand Hall of the Jinjiang Hotel in Shanghai. A couple of weeks ago, Dr Kissinger returned to the Jinjiang to deliver a speech commemorating the events of 1972.
I do not know if Dr Kissinger took the time to explore the surrounding area. If he did, he would have possibly seen the nearby theatre that regularly plays the latest offering from Hollywood. He would have probably come across the American fast food outlets or the Italian designer clothing store just down the block. Before crossing the street, he would have likely had to wait for a line of Japanese cars to pass and perhaps even the bus emblazoned with a larger-than-life Winnie the Pooh. And if he stayed out late enough, he would have undoubtedly been able to stroll back to the hotel under the colorful neon lights advertising German cellular phones. In short, he would have definitely seen a very different China today than the one he saw 30 years ago.
Existing uncertainties
The second area I want to focus on is what we know we do not know. In other words, the uncertainties related to the further opening of China's market.
Clearly, we do not know exactly how numerous industries will evolve. And it is a lack of advanced knowledge that is prompting much speculation. In the area of financial services for example, some predict that many of China's domestic banks will have a limited life span once the market is fully opened up in five years time.
Personally, I do not share this view. I think they will be very strong competitors. Partly because they are in the advantageous position of knowing the marketplace. Partly because they have national networks that are impossible - not to mention impractical - to match. And partly because they have a strong base of customers and are becoming increasingly modern. Consider the Mainland's largest bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. It recently announced that it has more than 10,000 corporates and 1.8 million individuals using its online banking services. But the main reason I think domestic banks in China will be strong competitors: they are very fast learners.
Another thing we know we do not know - and this specifically relates to Hong Kong - is the indirect benefits that will flow from a more open market in China.
For example, if mainland investors are allowed to invest their foreign exchange holdings in Hong Kong, the SAR's stock market would clearly benefit. Hong Kong's position as a fund raising centre for Mainland companies would also be enhanced. We know this idea is under consideration. We also know we do not know when it may happen.
Likewise, we know that if banks in Hong Kong are permitted to accept RMB deposits, the SAR's status as an international financial centre and as the premier regional financial centre will be enhanced even further. Once again we know this idea is being considered, but we do not know when it may happen.
A third unknown - and one that has been getting considerable attention recently - is the accuracy of some of China's statistics. As you are undoubtedly aware, questions have been raised about certain numbers. Even senior Mainland officials concede that some data is flawed. For example, the head of the Central Bank recently confirmed that levels of non-performing loans at China's big state banks are in fact higher than official estimates. However, numbers only tell part of any story. Whether one agrees with official estimates of GDP growth or not, no one can deny that China is developing rapidly. At least not anyone who visits China on a regular basis.
Finally, we know that we do not know how China will change the WTO. What role will the country play in shaping future trade talks? Will China's presence prompt other members to address the concerns of developing nations more readily? And how will another large player at the table affect overall group dynamics?
One thing that is clear: the WTO is much more of a global body now than it was prior to China's entry. Simply put, no organization can rightly call itself global if it does not include the world's most populous nation.
Forgotten knowledge
The third area I want to discuss is what we do not know we know. A translation of which might be the things we already know but often overlook or outright forget.
For example, when it comes to Hong Kong, some people seem to think the SAR will be surpassed. Replaced if you will. This doomsday group seems to forget the fact that many of Hong Kong's infrastructural and institutional attributes - including its free-market philosophy, the rule of law and free flow of capital - are attributes which are impossible for any other city in China to replicate any time soon
In terms of China itself, some executives of some companies still drool over the prospects of selling their goods or services to a single market of 1.3 billion people. They seem to overlook or forget the fact that the Mainland market includes 23 provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities directly under the central government, five special economic zones, 14 open coastal and border cities, 15 export processing areas, 14 bonded zones, some 30 provincial-level economic and technological development zones and more than 50 new and high-technology development zones. At least at last count.
And while the preferential policies of some of these special zones will gradually disappear under WTO, the complexities of doing business in such a vast market will not. A fact which - I submit - should subdue any remaining overactive salivary glands.
Finally, there are some who seem to think that China's entry into the WTO will provide an avenue to solve all future trade disputes. They seem to forget that the WTO is often used more as a weapon for protectionism than as a shield for open markets.
Personally, I think China will work very hard to live up to its commitments and to operate within the rules of the WTO. And if they are smart - and I think they are - they will also seek ways to exploit the rules to the benefit of their own industries. In other words they will act much like every other country on the WTO membership list.
Applying one's knowledge
Against this backdrop of knowledge - both the known and the unknown - it is clear that some foreign companies are itching to get access to the Mainland market.
I recall reading the comments of one executive who said his two most important questions about China are "which month" and "which day" his company will get the necessary approvals. He went on to say: "If I get four questions, then the third question would be at which hour, and the fourth at which minute we will get our license."
And just so you know, you can all breathe easier, he was not from an American company!
The reality is that anyone focused solely on the short-term gains or anyone who is prone to impatience is destined to be disappointed. China is like any developing market. It takes time to build a business. Profits cannot be made overnight. It is not a place for foreign companies to improve next quarter's earnings.
HSBC for its part is not a typical foreign company in the Mainland. As I mentioned earlier, our roots are in China. We have had a continuous presence in the Mainland for more than 135 years. Our name is also well known. For example, one survey done in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou found that we were by far the most-recognised foreign financial institution. Close to 90 per cent of the respondents said they were familiar with the name HSBC. The next closest foreign bank scored in the low 70s.
Despite this history and this recognition, we know that we will not automatically benefit from the further opening of China's financial services sector under WTO. We know that we will have to work very hard to maintain our position. And we are.
We have moved our China headquarters to Pudong in Shanghai. We have signed RMB remittance pacts with all four of the big state banks and we continue to seek ways to enhance our co-operation with domestic banks. On the people side, localisation remains a top priority. Already, nine out of every 10 of our Mainland staff are hired locally.
Recently we along with a few other foreign banks were given permission to offer foreign currency services to mainland Chinese citizens and corporations in select cities. In HSBC's case, we are allowed to offer such services in three cities: Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.
Last December we also purchased an 8 per cent equity stake in the Bank of Shanghai. In addition to becoming the first foreign commercial bank to be allowed to invest in a domestic Chinese bank, we also became - in effect - partners with the Shanghai Municipal Government, the major shareholder in the bank. For us, it was a high and historic note on which to end the year 2001.
Just as an aside, not everyone seems to agree that our purchase of a strategic stake in the Bank of Shanghai was all that momentous.
For example, in subsequent articles heralding the precedent-setting deal, one foreign banker was quoted as saying: "Most of the banks have been offering 15 per cent to the market. If you get 15 per cent you don't get anything." Another foreign banker said that our purchase was "only symbolic" and "without any actual benefits." He also said that his bank had no interest in acquiring a minority stake in any Mainland financial institution
I will not tell you who made these rather pessimistic comments, if for no other reason than to help both individuals 'save face' should their banks later decide to reconsider. What I will say is that both work for our so-called 'strategic competitors'. Consequently, I am inclined to think they were suffering from a touch of fermented fruit syndrome. Otherwise known as a case of sour grapes!
Conclusion
I have spent much of my time this morning talking about the implications of an agreement which became official on the 11th of December 2001. I also briefly mentioned another history-making agreement that was signed on the 28th of February 1972.
In fact, there are a number of striking similarities between China's entry into the WTO and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqu¨|.
Both agreements changed the world significantly. Both agreements set the stage for increased contact . . . economic and otherwise. And both agreements also came after some considerable negotiation.
At the outset of the 1972 talks, Dr Kissinger reportedly told his Chinese hosts: "The good thing about our relationship is that we want nothing from each other."
Chairman Mao is said to have promptly disagreed, noting: "If I had wanted nothing from you, I wouldn't have invited you. And if you wanted nothing from me, you shouldn't have come."
Similar sentiments apply to the WTO agreement. If China did not have something to gain, it would not have joined the WTO. Nor would it have made, as some observers suggest, commitments that are far more reaching than any previous membership applicant has. Likewise, foreign companies would not be flocking to and expanding their operations in China if they thought there was nothing to gain. Nor if they thought there were no profits to be made.
In closing, let me make one final observation about Hong Kong and the impact of China's entry into the WTO.
I know and I think all of you would agree that Hong Kong is well positioned to play a significant role in the post-entry period. And I know that I know the people of Hong Kong have the capacity and the capability to respond to new challenges. Simply put, I know that if New York is the city that never sleeps, then Hong Kong is the city that never stagnates.
Thank you.
中國與WTO：十五年的渴望
艾爾敦先生:
先生們，女士們，早上好！
今天我站在這里，要向大家坦白。
是關(guān)于最近我說過的一些話。
一個(gè)月前，我向另一些美國聽眾發(fā)表了講話。那是在香港的美國商會(huì)的一次聚會(huì)上。我談到香港的角色正在發(fā)生變化?，F(xiàn)在外國公司在中國開展業(yè)務(wù)越來越容易， 所以我也談到了在這種情況下香港怎樣進(jìn)行競爭。
就在那一天，也就是在三月份，我提出了幾點(diǎn)建議。其中一點(diǎn)是香港的政府官員和商業(yè)人員在去海外時(shí)應(yīng)該多花些時(shí)間向那些對(duì)香港持懷疑態(tài)度的人宣傳香港，而不要花太多時(shí)間和對(duì)香港友好的人談?wù)撓愀邸?BR> 所以我今天會(huì)站在這里，站在一群對(duì)香港極為友好的人面前，直截了當(dāng)?shù)剡`背自己提出的建議。既然這么說，我打算對(duì)自己說過的話作出補(bǔ)償，不用太多的時(shí)間談?wù)撓愀?- 這個(gè)話題對(duì)于今天的聽眾來說已經(jīng)非常熟悉了。我想多談一些大家不太熟悉的東西。尤其是中國加入WTO所產(chǎn)生的影響，對(duì)香港的影響，還有對(duì)外國公司的影響。
這樣，我準(zhǔn)備集中談?wù)撊糠值膬?nèi)容:
我們知道自己已經(jīng)了解的事;
我們知道自己還沒有了解的事; 還有
我們不知道自己已經(jīng)了解的事
眾所周知的內(nèi)容
首先是我們知道自己已經(jīng)了解的事。我們知道中國對(duì)于不同的人來說意味著不同的東西。
對(duì)于海外的制造商和貿(mào)易公司來說，中國是"有著十多億購買鞋子、汽車和電腦的消費(fèi)者的國家"。 對(duì)于已經(jīng)在中國的外國公司來說，在這里擴(kuò)展業(yè)務(wù)是理所當(dāng)然的。事實(shí)上，最近的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查表明，在中國運(yùn)作的每十家外國公司中有九家計(jì)劃在未來三年里擴(kuò)大投資。對(duì)于外資的金融機(jī)構(gòu)來說 - 尤其是那些對(duì)提供財(cái)富管理服務(wù)感興趣的外資金融機(jī)構(gòu)來說 - 中國是一個(gè)有著巨大潛力的市場。畢竟這是一個(gè)有著全世界存款率的國家。根據(jù)報(bào)道，在中國超過80%的銀行存款存在20%的賬戶之中。對(duì)于我的銀行 - 匯豐銀行 - 來說，中國是我們的誕生地。對(duì)于各位的總統(tǒng)來說，中國是 '戰(zhàn)略性的競爭對(duì)手'。
另一件我們知道自己已經(jīng)了解的事，也是在座的各位聽眾了解的事，就是中國加入WTO意味著香港的角色肯定會(huì)發(fā)生變化。
香港一度曾經(jīng)是進(jìn)入中國內(nèi)地市場的通道。它是一條至關(guān)重要的紐帶，聯(lián)系著東西方，聯(lián)系著發(fā)達(dá)國家和欠發(fā)達(dá)的國家，聯(lián)系著資本主義經(jīng)濟(jì)和改革之中的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，也聯(lián)系著中國和世界各地。今天，香港已經(jīng)不再擁有這一特殊地位。事實(shí)上，香港失去這一地位已經(jīng)有一段時(shí)間了。在中國加入WTO之前，各公司早就選擇繞過香港，直接進(jìn)入北京，上海和中國內(nèi)地的其他地方。當(dāng)然，也有大量公司還是到香港來，以利用這座城市與中國內(nèi)地在地理，經(jīng)濟(jì)，政治和文化方面的緊密聯(lián)系。大家也都看到，還有公司陸續(xù)到來。
我們也知道中國正同時(shí)處于兩種轉(zhuǎn)變之中：從計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)到市場經(jīng)濟(jì)，從農(nóng)業(yè)到都市社會(huì)。我們也知道這個(gè)國家正面臨著一系列的挑戰(zhàn)：有效分配涌入的資金；改革國有企業(yè)；創(chuàng)造更多的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)；更平均地分配財(cái)富；減少官僚作風(fēng)；還有杜絕腐敗?，F(xiàn)在，還可以加上一條：達(dá)到WTO成員國的承諾和期望。
最后，我們知道中國在相對(duì)較短的時(shí)間里發(fā)生了巨大的變化。三十年前美國總統(tǒng)尼克松和他的國家安全事務(wù)助理基辛格對(duì)中國進(jìn)行了一次具有歷史意義的訪問。他們?yōu)槠谄咛斓脑L問的最后一項(xiàng)內(nèi)容是在上海的錦江飯店小禮堂簽訂上海公報(bào)。就在幾星期前，基辛格博士又來到錦江飯店發(fā)表講話，紀(jì)念1972年的這一事件。
我不知道基辛格博士是否花時(shí)間去周圍的地方看過。如果他這么做了，他可能會(huì)看到附近的一家電*，這家電*經(jīng)常上映最新的好萊塢大片。沿著大街走，他可能會(huì)見到美式的快餐店或是意大利款式的服裝店。在過馬路之前，他很有可能要等著一長排日本汽車開過，甚至是畫著非常顯眼的小熊維尼圖案的公共汽車。如果他在外面逗留到很晚，他一定會(huì)在做著德國移動(dòng)電話廣告的霓虹燈下漫步回到賓館?？偠灾?，他現(xiàn)在一定會(huì)看到與三十年前完全不同的一個(gè)中國。
存在的不確定因素
我想說的第二部分是我們知道自己不了解的東西。換句話說，就是有關(guān)中國市場進(jìn)一步開放的不確定因素。
很明顯，我們不知道到底這么多行業(yè)會(huì)怎樣發(fā)展。由于對(duì)事情缺乏深入的了解而導(dǎo)致許多揣測。比如，在金融服務(wù)這一方面，有一些人預(yù)測，一旦市場在五年后完全開放，許多中資銀行就會(huì)陸續(xù)關(guān)門。
我個(gè)人不同意這種看法。我認(rèn)為這些中資銀行將會(huì)是非常強(qiáng)勁的競爭對(duì)手。這一部分是因?yàn)檫@些銀行了解市場，處于有利地位。另一部分原因是它們有遍布全國的網(wǎng)絡(luò)， 這一點(diǎn)是根本無法匹敵的，更不用說趕上它們是不切實(shí)際的了。還有一部分原因是它們擁有強(qiáng)大的客戶基礎(chǔ)，并且正在逐步走向現(xiàn)代化。比如中國內(nèi)地的銀行 - 中國工商銀行，最近這家銀行宣布有超過10,000家企業(yè)和一百八十萬的個(gè)人在使用其網(wǎng)上銀行的服務(wù)。但是我認(rèn)為中資銀行將成為強(qiáng)勁競爭對(duì)手的主要原因是：它們學(xué)習(xí)的速度非?？臁?BR> 另一件我們知道自己不了解的事和香港很有關(guān)系，就是從更加開放的中國市場獲得的間接利益。
比如，如果內(nèi)地的投資者獲準(zhǔn)在香港投資外幣股票，香港特別行政區(qū)的股票市場肯定會(huì)得到好處。香港作為內(nèi)地公司募集資金的中心，地位也會(huì)提高。我們知道這一想法正在考慮之中。我們也知道我們不了解這種情況什么時(shí)候會(huì)發(fā)生。
同樣地，我們知道如果香港的銀行獲準(zhǔn)接受人民幣存款，香港特別行政區(qū)作為國際金融中心和主要的地區(qū)性金融中心，它的地位將會(huì)更進(jìn)一步提高。我們也知道這一想法正在考慮之中，但是我們不知道這種情況什么時(shí)候會(huì)發(fā)生。
第三件我們不知道的事 - 這在最近也引起了相當(dāng)多的關(guān)注 - 就是某些關(guān)于中國的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字的準(zhǔn)確性。大家一定也知道，人們對(duì)某些數(shù)字提出了問題。甚至內(nèi)地的高級(jí)官員也承認(rèn)有一些數(shù)據(jù)存在錯(cuò)誤。比如，中國人民銀行行長最近證實(shí)，中國較大的國有銀行的不良貸款的程度事實(shí)上比官方估測的更高。但是，數(shù)字僅僅說明了問題的一部分。無論人們是否贊同官方對(duì)國民生產(chǎn)總值增長的估測，沒有人可以否認(rèn)中國正在飛速發(fā)展。至少?zèng)]有一個(gè)經(jīng)常去中國的人會(huì)否認(rèn)這一點(diǎn)。
最后，我們知道我們不了解中國會(huì)怎樣改變WTO。對(duì)于形成未來的貿(mào)易對(duì)話，中國會(huì)扮演什么樣的角色? 中國的加入是否會(huì)使其他成員國更愿意關(guān)注發(fā)展中國家的問題？桌邊又一個(gè)大玩家會(huì)對(duì)全組的動(dòng)力產(chǎn)生什么樣的影響？
有一點(diǎn)是非常清楚的：現(xiàn)在WTO比在中國加入之前更成為一個(gè)全球性的組織。 簡單地說，如果不包括這個(gè)全世界具有最多人口的國家，沒有一個(gè)組織可以問心無愧地說自己是全球性的組織。
被遺忘的內(nèi)容
我想討論的第三部分是我們不知道自己了解的事。也可以說是我們已經(jīng)知道，但經(jīng)常忽略或者完全忘記的東西。
比如，當(dāng)提到香港時(shí)，有些人似乎認(rèn)為香港特別行政區(qū)會(huì)被超越。如果你愿意，也可以說是替代。這些認(rèn)為到了世界末日的人似乎忘記了這一事實(shí)，許多香港的基礎(chǔ)結(jié)構(gòu)和機(jī)構(gòu)的特質(zhì) - 包括它的自由市場的思想，法治和資本的自由流動(dòng) - 是中國的任何其它城市在短時(shí)間內(nèi)都無法效仿的。
對(duì)于中國本身，某些公司的高級(jí)官員還是滿懷信心，希望可以把自己的商品或服務(wù)銷售給一個(gè)擁有13億消費(fèi)者的市場。 他們似乎忽略或者忘記了這一事實(shí)，中國內(nèi)地的市場包括23個(gè)省，5個(gè)自治區(qū)，4個(gè)直轄市，5個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)，14個(gè)沿海和沿邊開放城市，15個(gè)出口加工區(qū)，14個(gè)保稅區(qū)，大約30個(gè)省級(jí)經(jīng)濟(jì)和科技發(fā)展區(qū)， 還有超過50個(gè)新興的高科技發(fā)展區(qū)。至少最近的一次統(tǒng)計(jì)是這樣。
盡管在中國加入WTO 以后某些區(qū)域的優(yōu)惠政策會(huì)逐步取消，在這樣一個(gè)巨大的市場里開展業(yè)務(wù)的復(fù)雜性并不會(huì)消失。我承認(rèn)，這一事實(shí)會(huì)打消任何對(duì)這個(gè)市場過度樂觀的念頭。
最后，有一些人似乎認(rèn)為中國加入WTO 會(huì)為未來所有的貿(mào)易爭端提供解決的方法。 他們似乎忘記了WTO經(jīng)常更多地被用作保護(hù)貿(mào)易主義的武器，而不是用作開放市場的盾牌。
我個(gè)人認(rèn)為，中國將會(huì)非常努力地爭取完成它的承諾，并且遵守WTO的規(guī)則運(yùn)作。 如果中國人夠聰明 - 我認(rèn)為他們確實(shí)如此 - 他們也會(huì)為了本國行業(yè)的利益而尋找可以利用這些規(guī)則的方法。換句話說，他們的行動(dòng)會(huì)和WTO 成員國名單上的其它國家一樣。
應(yīng)用自己的知識(shí)
在這種認(rèn)知的基礎(chǔ)上 - 包括已知的和未知的 - 很明顯某些外國公司正渴望進(jìn)入中國內(nèi)地市場。
我記得讀到過一位高級(jí)官員的評(píng)論，他說他對(duì)于中國的兩個(gè)最重要的問題是"哪個(gè)月" 和"哪一天"他的公司可以得到必須的批準(zhǔn)。他又說："如果我有四個(gè)問題，那么第三個(gè)問題就是在哪一個(gè)小時(shí)，第四個(gè)問題則是哪一分鐘我們可以得到許可。"
盡管如此，大家可以松一口氣，因?yàn)樗皇莵碜杂诿绹荆?BR> 實(shí)際上，任何一個(gè)僅僅注重短期利益增長的人或是任何一個(gè)容易失去耐心的人都注定會(huì)失望。中國同任何發(fā)展中的市場都一樣。業(yè)務(wù)的建立需要一定的時(shí)間。利潤不可能很快就得到。中國這個(gè)地方不能使外國公司馬上提高下一季度的收入。
匯豐銀行在中國內(nèi)地并不是典型的外國公司。我剛才已經(jīng)提到過，我們的誕生地就在中國。我們在中國內(nèi)地的業(yè)務(wù)從未間斷，已超過了135年。我們的名字也廣為人知。比如，在北京，上海和廣州進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)，我們迄今為止是知名度的外資金融機(jī)構(gòu)。接近90%的受訪者說他們對(duì)匯豐這個(gè)名字很熟悉。排在第二位的外資銀行認(rèn)知率僅僅為70%。
盡管我們有悠久的歷史和比較高的知名度，我們知道自己不會(huì)從中國在加入WTO后進(jìn)一步開放的金融服務(wù)中自動(dòng)獲得利益。我們知道自己必須非常努力才能保持自己的地位。我們確實(shí)是在這么做。
我們已經(jīng)把中國業(yè)務(wù)總部遷到了上海浦東。我們已經(jīng)和所有四大國有銀行簽訂了人民幣匯款的合作條約，我們也繼續(xù)在尋找增強(qiáng)同中資銀行合作的途徑。在員工這方面，本地化一直是優(yōu)先考慮的問題。我們在內(nèi)地的員工已經(jīng)有90%是在本地招聘的。
最近我們和其他幾家外資銀行一起獲準(zhǔn)在部分城市向中國內(nèi)地的居民和企業(yè)提供外幣業(yè)務(wù)。我們匯豐獲準(zhǔn)在北京，上海和廣州這三個(gè)城市提供這項(xiàng)服務(wù)。
去年12月我們購入了上海銀行8%的股權(quán)。除了成為第一家獲準(zhǔn)投資中資銀行的外資商業(yè)銀行之外，我們也成為 - 事實(shí)上是如此 - 上海市政府的合作伙伴，因?yàn)樗巧虾ｃy行的主要股東。對(duì)于我們來說，這是為2001年的末尾添上的圓滿的一筆，具有很大的歷史意義。
結(jié)論
今天早上我已經(jīng)花了很多時(shí)間談?wù)搹?001年12月11日開始正式生效的WTO協(xié)議所帶來的影響。 我也簡單提到了另一個(gè)在1972年2月28日簽訂的具有歷史意義的協(xié)議。
事實(shí)上，在中國加入WTO 和中美上海公報(bào)的簽訂這兩者之間有許多相似的地方。
這兩個(gè)協(xié)議都顯著地改變了整個(gè)世界。兩個(gè)協(xié)議都標(biāo)志著逐步增加接觸的開始 . . . 包括經(jīng)濟(jì)的，還有其它方面的。并且兩個(gè)協(xié)議也都是在多次談判之后才達(dá)成。
據(jù)報(bào)道，在1972年對(duì)話的開始，基辛格博士就對(duì)中國的東道主說："我們之間的關(guān)系之中有一點(diǎn)很好，就是我們都不想從對(duì)方那里獲得什么。"
據(jù)說毛主席立刻反對(duì)說："如果我什么都不想從你們那里得到，我就不會(huì)邀請(qǐng)你們。如果你們什么都不想從我們這里得到，你們也就不會(huì)來了。"
同樣的感覺也適用于WTO 協(xié)議。如果中國不想獲得什么，就不會(huì)加入WTO。正如一些觀察家所指出的，它也就不會(huì)作出比任何以往的成員申請(qǐng)國影響更深遠(yuǎn)的承諾。同樣地，如果外國公司認(rèn)為什么都得不到，也就不會(huì)蜂擁到中國來擴(kuò)展他們的業(yè)務(wù)。如果他們認(rèn)為無利可圖，也不會(huì)這樣做。
在結(jié)束之前，我想最后再評(píng)述一下關(guān)于香港的情況和中國加入WTO 的影響。
我知道，而且我相信各位都同意這一點(diǎn)，香港處于有利的位置，可以在中國入世后扮演重要的角色。我也知道，我知道香港人有能力應(yīng)付新的挑戰(zhàn)。簡單地說，我知道如果紐約是不眠的城市，那么香港就是從不停滯的城市。
謝謝大家。