英語聽力頻道為大家整理的普特英語聽力網(wǎng)：安倍應(yīng)該對(duì)日本央行施壓，供大家參考:)
The risky task of relaunching Japan
Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, continues to astonish. He could hardly have chosen a more radical team than the one he has appointed to run the Bank of Japan. Haruhiko Kuroda, a critic of the BoJ’s past passivity, is now in charge of monetary policy.
日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)繼續(xù)其驚人表現(xiàn)。他任命了一個(gè)激進(jìn)得不能再激進(jìn)的日本央行(BoJ)團(tuán)隊(duì)。曾經(jīng)批評(píng)日本央行被動(dòng)無為的黑田東彥(Haruhiko Kuroda)，現(xiàn)在負(fù)責(zé)日本的貨幣政策。
Make no mistake. Mr Kuroda not only wants to deliver 2 per cent annual inflation, but considers this to be within the power of the central bank. He can also expect to have the backing of the government and the new deputy governors, Kikuo Iwata and Hiroshi Nakaso. The BoJ may grumble. But a shift in policy seems sure. The question is: will it work? Indeed, what might “work” mean?
別搞錯(cuò)。黑田東彥不僅希望實(shí)現(xiàn)2%的年度通脹目標(biāo)，而且還認(rèn)為這是央行力所能及的事。他還能獲得政府和兩位新任副行長(zhǎng)巖田規(guī)久男(Kikuo Iwata)和中曾宏(Hiroshi Nakaso)的支持。日本央行的官員階層可能會(huì)抱怨。但政策轉(zhuǎn)變似乎確定無疑。問題在于：它會(huì)奏效嗎？的確，“奏效”意味著什么？
One must start by noting Japan’s peculiar position. Expectations of deflation are well entrenched, in bond markets, if not in surveys, with yields on government 10-year bonds now at 66 basis points (see chart). Real rates of interest have remained positive, even at the short end. Deflation has also been very sticky. Finally, the distribution of debt has shifted from the private to the public sectors: according to economic advisers Smithers and Co net debt of non-financial companies has fallen from 150 per cent of equity in 1995 to 30 per cent. But government net debt has jumped from 29 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of 1996 to 135 per cent at the end of 2012.
首先必須注意日本獨(dú)特的處境。在債券市場(chǎng)，通縮預(yù)期根深蒂固（即使這不是調(diào)查所顯示的），日本10年期國債收益率目前為66個(gè)基點(diǎn)（見圖表）。實(shí)際利率依然為正，即便短期債券也是這樣。通縮還非常頑固。最后，債務(wù)分布已從私人部門轉(zhuǎn)向公共部門：經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問公司Smithers and Co的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，非金融企業(yè)的凈債務(wù)/股本比率已從1995年的150%降至30%。但政府凈債務(wù)與國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的比率已從1996年底的29%，飆升至2012年底的135%。
These facts have deep implications. First, ending deflation is going to be far harder than it would have been in the late 1990s. Second, it would be helpful if higher inflation also made real interest rates negative, which would encourage people to spend. Third, negative real rates would also redistribute wealth from the state’s creditors towards future taxpayers.
這些事實(shí)具有深層次的影響。首先，結(jié)束通縮將比上世紀(jì)90年代末期困難得多。其次，如果高通脹也使得實(shí)際利率為負(fù)，鼓勵(lì)人們消費(fèi)，那將是有益的。第三，負(fù)實(shí)際利率還會(huì)重新分配財(cái)富，使其從政府的債權(quán)人流向未來的納稅人。
Such negative real rates can be achieved either by making inflation higher than expected or by capping interest rates. It is not, in fact, clear whether the Japanese authorities want to create strongly negative real rates of interest. But they should, even though this would also create the risk of a political backlash.
要達(dá)到這種負(fù)的實(shí)際利率，要么可以讓通脹超過預(yù)期，要么可以制定利率上限。實(shí)際上，尚不清楚日本官方是否希望出現(xiàn)明顯的負(fù)實(shí)際利率。但他們應(yīng)該這么希望，即便這也會(huì)帶來政治反彈的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
How should this be done and how transparently? The BoJ could insist that it is aiming at 2 per cent inflation, but follow policies likely to bring higher inflation than this. That would be risky deceit. Alternatively, it could announce the aim of higher inflation, while announcing a lengthy period of low nominal interest rates. This would be an open inflation tax.
如何達(dá)到明顯的負(fù)實(shí)際利率？采用的手段需要有多大的透明度？日本央行可以堅(jiān)稱它力求達(dá)到2%的通脹目標(biāo)，但實(shí)際上采取很可能讓通脹水平高于該目標(biāo)的政策。那將是高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的欺騙?；蛘?，它可以宣布更高的通脹目標(biāo)，同時(shí)宣布一段漫長(zhǎng)的低名義利率時(shí)期。這將是一種不加掩飾的通脹稅。
Either way, policy could be buttressed by a temporary move to a target for price or nominal GDP levels. The argument for this is that bygones should not, in this extreme case, be bygones. The current price level is 30 per cent below where it would have been if annual inflation had been 2 per cent since 1997.
無論采取哪種方式，政策都可以得到臨時(shí)采用的價(jià)格水平或名義GDP目標(biāo)的支持。理由是，在這種極端情況下，過去的不應(yīng)該讓它過去。如果自1997年以來每年通脹率為2%，那么價(jià)格水平將會(huì)比現(xiàn)在高30%。
The risky task of relaunching Japan
Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, continues to astonish. He could hardly have chosen a more radical team than the one he has appointed to run the Bank of Japan. Haruhiko Kuroda, a critic of the BoJ’s past passivity, is now in charge of monetary policy.
日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)繼續(xù)其驚人表現(xiàn)。他任命了一個(gè)激進(jìn)得不能再激進(jìn)的日本央行(BoJ)團(tuán)隊(duì)。曾經(jīng)批評(píng)日本央行被動(dòng)無為的黑田東彥(Haruhiko Kuroda)，現(xiàn)在負(fù)責(zé)日本的貨幣政策。
Make no mistake. Mr Kuroda not only wants to deliver 2 per cent annual inflation, but considers this to be within the power of the central bank. He can also expect to have the backing of the government and the new deputy governors, Kikuo Iwata and Hiroshi Nakaso. The BoJ may grumble. But a shift in policy seems sure. The question is: will it work? Indeed, what might “work” mean?
別搞錯(cuò)。黑田東彥不僅希望實(shí)現(xiàn)2%的年度通脹目標(biāo)，而且還認(rèn)為這是央行力所能及的事。他還能獲得政府和兩位新任副行長(zhǎng)巖田規(guī)久男(Kikuo Iwata)和中曾宏(Hiroshi Nakaso)的支持。日本央行的官員階層可能會(huì)抱怨。但政策轉(zhuǎn)變似乎確定無疑。問題在于：它會(huì)奏效嗎？的確，“奏效”意味著什么？
One must start by noting Japan’s peculiar position. Expectations of deflation are well entrenched, in bond markets, if not in surveys, with yields on government 10-year bonds now at 66 basis points (see chart). Real rates of interest have remained positive, even at the short end. Deflation has also been very sticky. Finally, the distribution of debt has shifted from the private to the public sectors: according to economic advisers Smithers and Co net debt of non-financial companies has fallen from 150 per cent of equity in 1995 to 30 per cent. But government net debt has jumped from 29 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of 1996 to 135 per cent at the end of 2012.
首先必須注意日本獨(dú)特的處境。在債券市場(chǎng)，通縮預(yù)期根深蒂固（即使這不是調(diào)查所顯示的），日本10年期國債收益率目前為66個(gè)基點(diǎn)（見圖表）。實(shí)際利率依然為正，即便短期債券也是這樣。通縮還非常頑固。最后，債務(wù)分布已從私人部門轉(zhuǎn)向公共部門：經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問公司Smithers and Co的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，非金融企業(yè)的凈債務(wù)/股本比率已從1995年的150%降至30%。但政府凈債務(wù)與國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的比率已從1996年底的29%，飆升至2012年底的135%。
These facts have deep implications. First, ending deflation is going to be far harder than it would have been in the late 1990s. Second, it would be helpful if higher inflation also made real interest rates negative, which would encourage people to spend. Third, negative real rates would also redistribute wealth from the state’s creditors towards future taxpayers.
這些事實(shí)具有深層次的影響。首先，結(jié)束通縮將比上世紀(jì)90年代末期困難得多。其次，如果高通脹也使得實(shí)際利率為負(fù)，鼓勵(lì)人們消費(fèi)，那將是有益的。第三，負(fù)實(shí)際利率還會(huì)重新分配財(cái)富，使其從政府的債權(quán)人流向未來的納稅人。
Such negative real rates can be achieved either by making inflation higher than expected or by capping interest rates. It is not, in fact, clear whether the Japanese authorities want to create strongly negative real rates of interest. But they should, even though this would also create the risk of a political backlash.
要達(dá)到這種負(fù)的實(shí)際利率，要么可以讓通脹超過預(yù)期，要么可以制定利率上限。實(shí)際上，尚不清楚日本官方是否希望出現(xiàn)明顯的負(fù)實(shí)際利率。但他們應(yīng)該這么希望，即便這也會(huì)帶來政治反彈的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
How should this be done and how transparently? The BoJ could insist that it is aiming at 2 per cent inflation, but follow policies likely to bring higher inflation than this. That would be risky deceit. Alternatively, it could announce the aim of higher inflation, while announcing a lengthy period of low nominal interest rates. This would be an open inflation tax.
如何達(dá)到明顯的負(fù)實(shí)際利率？采用的手段需要有多大的透明度？日本央行可以堅(jiān)稱它力求達(dá)到2%的通脹目標(biāo)，但實(shí)際上采取很可能讓通脹水平高于該目標(biāo)的政策。那將是高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的欺騙?；蛘?，它可以宣布更高的通脹目標(biāo)，同時(shí)宣布一段漫長(zhǎng)的低名義利率時(shí)期。這將是一種不加掩飾的通脹稅。
Either way, policy could be buttressed by a temporary move to a target for price or nominal GDP levels. The argument for this is that bygones should not, in this extreme case, be bygones. The current price level is 30 per cent below where it would have been if annual inflation had been 2 per cent since 1997.
無論采取哪種方式，政策都可以得到臨時(shí)采用的價(jià)格水平或名義GDP目標(biāo)的支持。理由是，在這種極端情況下，過去的不應(yīng)該讓它過去。如果自1997年以來每年通脹率為2%，那么價(jià)格水平將會(huì)比現(xiàn)在高30%。