Professor Tommy Koh, Singapore's Ambassador-At-Large and the Executive Director of Asia-Europe Foundation delivered the following speech at the APEC Business Advisory Council in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei on February 6, 1999. He expressed confidence that Asia will recover from the current economic crisis, provided that the governments concerned are determined to choose the necessary conditions for it to happen.
My topic assumes that East Asia will recover from the present economic crisis. The first question I will address is： “Will Asia recover？” I believe that Asia will recover. I do so for the following three reasons.
Three reasons Asia will recover
First, East Asia continues to enjoy some strong fundamentals. They include our strong work ethic, our tradition of thrift and high savings, our emphasis on education, our willingness to suffer pain in the short term for long term gain and our belief in free trade and open economies.
Second, there is empirical evidence to suggest that some of the economies affected by the crisis are turning around. Let us take Thailand and Korea as two examples. In both countries, the baht and the won have stabilised, interest rates have declined. Exports have grown and are in surplus.Thailand's and Korea's current accounts are also in surplus. As a hopeful sign of the return of investor confidence, new long-term investment or FDI has increased in 1998 as compared to 1997. The IMF, the World Bank and a majority of the world's private sector analysts expect the economies of East Asia to return to positive growth, if not in 1999, then in 2000.
Third, history gives me confidence that Asia will rebound. In 1965, the ten economies of East Asia accounted for only 9 per cent of the world economy. One decade later, in 1975, the percentage had gone up to 15%. By 1995, East Asia had almost caught up with the United States and the European Union. In that year, East Asia's share of the world economy was 25%. The US and EU each accounted for 29% of the world economy. I believe that the present crisis is only a temporary setback in East Asia's historic march towards economic parity with the United States and Western Europe.
Six lessons from the crisis
The second question which I would like to address is：“What lessons have I learnt from the crisis？”
I have personally learnt six lessons from the crisis. What are the six lessons？
First, do not borrow short-term to finance long-term projects；
Second, do not allow the total of your corporate debt to exceed the total of your country's foreign reserves；
Third, do not mis-allocate your capital and resources so as to create asset bubbles；
Fourth, abolish the phenomenon of crony capitalism because it creates the illusion of strong, competitive and profitable companies；
Fifth, with the exception of Hong Kong, do not align your currency to one major currency such as the US dollar. It is better to manage your currencies against a trade-weighted basket of currencies, including the US dollar, the Euro, the Yen and other hard currencies； and
Sixth, pace the liberalisation of your capital account and your financial sector in order to ensure that you have the strong financial institutions, the regulatory framework, and the competent and empowered regulators to withstand the force of the global capital market.
Six critical choices
What will the post-crisis economic landscape look like？
The frank answer is that I do not know. What it will look like will depend upon how Asia faces up to six critical choices.
What are the six critical choices？
First, we face a choice between clean and corrupt government；
Second, we face a choice between governments which are transparent and accountable to their people and governments which are opaque and not willing to account to their people；
Third, we face a choice between embracing good corporate governance or maintaining “KKN” or corruption, collusion and nepotism；
Fourth, we face the choice of turning inward and becoming protectionist or opening up our economies to foreign investment and facilitating mergers and acquisitions；
Fifth, we face the choice of protecting our conglomerates or allowing market forces to force them either to restructure in order to concentrate on their core competencies or to allow the uncompetitive ones to die； and
Sixth, our governments face the choice between building a stakeholder society in which there is a large measure of social equity and social cohesion and a society with a huge chasm between the haves and have-nots.
Conclusion
I have confidence in the future of Asia. There are early signs that some of the affected economies are in the process of recovery. My hope is that Asia will use this crisis as an opportunity to re-engineer itself, to correct its policy mistakes and institutional flaws. If Asia succeeds in abolishing the evils of “KKN” , embraces good corporate governance, evolves governments which are more transparent and accountable to their people and capitalism with a human face, then Asia will have a bright future. If, on the other hand, these problems are swept under the carpet, then I fear that a few years down the road, Asia will confront another crisis. The choice is in our hands.
危機(jī)后的亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)面貌：延續(xù)與改變
我國(guó)巡回大使及亞歐基金總干事許通美教授本月6日在文萊首都詩(shī)里巴加灣舉行的亞太經(jīng)合論壇商業(yè)咨詢理事會(huì)會(huì)議上發(fā)表演講。他深信亞洲將會(huì)從目前的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)中復(fù)蘇過(guò)來(lái),問(wèn)題是有關(guān)國(guó)家是否有決心選擇所需的條件以實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)。
以下是他的演講全文：
我的演講課題假定東亞將會(huì)從目前的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)中復(fù)原。我所要討論的第一個(gè)問(wèn)題是：“亞洲會(huì)復(fù)原嗎？”以下三個(gè)原因使我相信亞洲會(huì)復(fù)原。
亞洲會(huì)復(fù)原的三個(gè)理由
第一、東亞繼續(xù)享有穩(wěn)固的基礎(chǔ)。這些包括我們?cè)诠ぷ魃系那趭^、我們節(jié)儉和儲(chǔ)蓄的傳統(tǒng)、我們重視教育、我們?cè)敢馊淌芏虝r(shí)期的痛苦以圖長(zhǎng)期的回報(bào),以及我們堅(jiān)信自由貿(mào)易和開放經(jīng)濟(jì)。
第二、有確實(shí)的證據(jù)顯示,一些受危機(jī)影響的經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)在復(fù)原中。以泰國(guó)和韓國(guó)為例,泰銖和韓元都已經(jīng)穩(wěn)定了下來(lái)。利率也降低了。出口貿(mào)易取得成長(zhǎng),并享有盈余。兩國(guó)的經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目也享有盈余。
與1997年比較,1998年的新長(zhǎng)期投資項(xiàng)目或外國(guó)直接投資有了增長(zhǎng),是投資者恢復(fù)信心的指標(biāo)。國(guó)際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行和全球多數(shù)的私人企業(yè)分析家都預(yù)測(cè),東亞在1999年或2000年將會(huì)回到正數(shù)增長(zhǎng)。
第三、歷史使我對(duì)亞洲的復(fù)蘇更有信心。1965年,東亞的10個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中只占了9%.10年后的1975年,百分比上升到15%.到了1995年,東亞幾乎與美國(guó)和歐盟平起平坐。那一年,東亞在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中占了25%,而美國(guó)和歐盟的個(gè)別百分比為29%.我相信在東亞取得與美國(guó)和西歐平等經(jīng)濟(jì)地位的歷史過(guò)程中,目前的危機(jī)只不過(guò)是一個(gè)暫時(shí)性的挫折。
從危機(jī)中吸取六個(gè)教訓(xùn)
我要討論的第二個(gè)問(wèn)題是：“我從危機(jī)中學(xué)習(xí)到什么教訓(xùn)？”
我個(gè)人從危機(jī)中學(xué)習(xí)到了六個(gè)教訓(xùn),而這六個(gè)教訓(xùn)是什么呢？
第一、不要利用短期貸款以支付長(zhǎng)期項(xiàng)目。
第二、企業(yè)債務(wù)的總額不能超過(guò)國(guó)家外匯儲(chǔ)備的總額。
第三、不要錯(cuò)誤地分配資金和資源,以免產(chǎn)生資產(chǎn)泡沫式膨脹。
第四、廢除朋黨資本主義,因?yàn)樗o人一種假相,認(rèn)為這些公司都是穩(wěn)健、具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和享有盈余的公司。
第五、除了香港之外,不要將自己的貨幣與一個(gè)主要貨幣（如美元）掛鉤。較好的辦法是和一籃子的貨幣掛鉤,如美元、歐元、日元和其他穩(wěn)定的貨幣。
第六、有規(guī)律和平穩(wěn)地開放資金項(xiàng)目和金融業(yè),以確保強(qiáng)健的金融體系、調(diào)節(jié)系統(tǒng)以及有效率和權(quán)力的監(jiān)管人員,來(lái)抵擋全球資金市場(chǎng)的沖擊力。
六個(gè)關(guān)鍵性的選擇
危機(jī)后的亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)面貌將會(huì)如何？坦白說(shuō),我并不知道。經(jīng)濟(jì)的面貌如何將取決于亞洲會(huì)怎樣面對(duì)六個(gè)關(guān)鍵性的選擇。
是哪六個(gè)關(guān)鍵性的選擇？
第一、我們要廉潔的政府,還是貪污的政府？
第二、我們要透明、對(duì)人民負(fù)責(zé)的政府,還是不透明、不愿對(duì)人民負(fù)責(zé)的政府？
第三、我們要維護(hù)良好的企業(yè)管理方式,還是維持貪污、勾結(jié)、裙帶風(fēng)氣？
第四、我們要采取內(nèi)望策略、施行保護(hù)主義,還是開放經(jīng)濟(jì)給外來(lái)投資、使公司在進(jìn)行合并和收購(gòu)的時(shí)候更加便利？
第五、我們要保護(hù)我們的企業(yè)集團(tuán),還是讓市場(chǎng)力量迫使它們進(jìn)行改組,集中于核心業(yè)務(wù),或者讓那些不具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的企業(yè)關(guān)閉？
第六、我們的政府要建設(shè)一個(gè)全民有份、平等和團(tuán)結(jié)的社會(huì),還是一個(gè)貧富懸殊的社會(huì)？
總結(jié)
我對(duì)亞洲的未來(lái)有信心。有初步跡象顯示,一些受影響的經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)處于復(fù)蘇的過(guò)程中。我希望亞洲能夠把這次的危機(jī)轉(zhuǎn)化成契機(jī),重建自己,矯正錯(cuò)誤的政策和有缺陷的體系。如果亞洲成功地廢除貪污、勾結(jié)、裙帶風(fēng)氣,維護(hù)良好的企業(yè)管理方式,形成透明、對(duì)人民負(fù)責(zé)的政府和產(chǎn)生較有人情味的資本主義,那亞洲就會(huì)有一個(gè)光明的前途。相反的,如果對(duì)這些問(wèn)題都置之不理的話,恐怕亞洲在過(guò)幾年之后又會(huì)再面對(duì)另一個(gè)危機(jī)。選擇就在我們的手中。
My topic assumes that East Asia will recover from the present economic crisis. The first question I will address is： “Will Asia recover？” I believe that Asia will recover. I do so for the following three reasons.
Three reasons Asia will recover
First, East Asia continues to enjoy some strong fundamentals. They include our strong work ethic, our tradition of thrift and high savings, our emphasis on education, our willingness to suffer pain in the short term for long term gain and our belief in free trade and open economies.
Second, there is empirical evidence to suggest that some of the economies affected by the crisis are turning around. Let us take Thailand and Korea as two examples. In both countries, the baht and the won have stabilised, interest rates have declined. Exports have grown and are in surplus.Thailand's and Korea's current accounts are also in surplus. As a hopeful sign of the return of investor confidence, new long-term investment or FDI has increased in 1998 as compared to 1997. The IMF, the World Bank and a majority of the world's private sector analysts expect the economies of East Asia to return to positive growth, if not in 1999, then in 2000.
Third, history gives me confidence that Asia will rebound. In 1965, the ten economies of East Asia accounted for only 9 per cent of the world economy. One decade later, in 1975, the percentage had gone up to 15%. By 1995, East Asia had almost caught up with the United States and the European Union. In that year, East Asia's share of the world economy was 25%. The US and EU each accounted for 29% of the world economy. I believe that the present crisis is only a temporary setback in East Asia's historic march towards economic parity with the United States and Western Europe.
Six lessons from the crisis
The second question which I would like to address is：“What lessons have I learnt from the crisis？”
I have personally learnt six lessons from the crisis. What are the six lessons？
First, do not borrow short-term to finance long-term projects；
Second, do not allow the total of your corporate debt to exceed the total of your country's foreign reserves；
Third, do not mis-allocate your capital and resources so as to create asset bubbles；
Fourth, abolish the phenomenon of crony capitalism because it creates the illusion of strong, competitive and profitable companies；
Fifth, with the exception of Hong Kong, do not align your currency to one major currency such as the US dollar. It is better to manage your currencies against a trade-weighted basket of currencies, including the US dollar, the Euro, the Yen and other hard currencies； and
Sixth, pace the liberalisation of your capital account and your financial sector in order to ensure that you have the strong financial institutions, the regulatory framework, and the competent and empowered regulators to withstand the force of the global capital market.
Six critical choices
What will the post-crisis economic landscape look like？
The frank answer is that I do not know. What it will look like will depend upon how Asia faces up to six critical choices.
What are the six critical choices？
First, we face a choice between clean and corrupt government；
Second, we face a choice between governments which are transparent and accountable to their people and governments which are opaque and not willing to account to their people；
Third, we face a choice between embracing good corporate governance or maintaining “KKN” or corruption, collusion and nepotism；
Fourth, we face the choice of turning inward and becoming protectionist or opening up our economies to foreign investment and facilitating mergers and acquisitions；
Fifth, we face the choice of protecting our conglomerates or allowing market forces to force them either to restructure in order to concentrate on their core competencies or to allow the uncompetitive ones to die； and
Sixth, our governments face the choice between building a stakeholder society in which there is a large measure of social equity and social cohesion and a society with a huge chasm between the haves and have-nots.
Conclusion
I have confidence in the future of Asia. There are early signs that some of the affected economies are in the process of recovery. My hope is that Asia will use this crisis as an opportunity to re-engineer itself, to correct its policy mistakes and institutional flaws. If Asia succeeds in abolishing the evils of “KKN” , embraces good corporate governance, evolves governments which are more transparent and accountable to their people and capitalism with a human face, then Asia will have a bright future. If, on the other hand, these problems are swept under the carpet, then I fear that a few years down the road, Asia will confront another crisis. The choice is in our hands.
危機(jī)后的亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)面貌：延續(xù)與改變
我國(guó)巡回大使及亞歐基金總干事許通美教授本月6日在文萊首都詩(shī)里巴加灣舉行的亞太經(jīng)合論壇商業(yè)咨詢理事會(huì)會(huì)議上發(fā)表演講。他深信亞洲將會(huì)從目前的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)中復(fù)蘇過(guò)來(lái),問(wèn)題是有關(guān)國(guó)家是否有決心選擇所需的條件以實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)。
以下是他的演講全文：
我的演講課題假定東亞將會(huì)從目前的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)中復(fù)原。我所要討論的第一個(gè)問(wèn)題是：“亞洲會(huì)復(fù)原嗎？”以下三個(gè)原因使我相信亞洲會(huì)復(fù)原。
亞洲會(huì)復(fù)原的三個(gè)理由
第一、東亞繼續(xù)享有穩(wěn)固的基礎(chǔ)。這些包括我們?cè)诠ぷ魃系那趭^、我們節(jié)儉和儲(chǔ)蓄的傳統(tǒng)、我們重視教育、我們?cè)敢馊淌芏虝r(shí)期的痛苦以圖長(zhǎng)期的回報(bào),以及我們堅(jiān)信自由貿(mào)易和開放經(jīng)濟(jì)。
第二、有確實(shí)的證據(jù)顯示,一些受危機(jī)影響的經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)在復(fù)原中。以泰國(guó)和韓國(guó)為例,泰銖和韓元都已經(jīng)穩(wěn)定了下來(lái)。利率也降低了。出口貿(mào)易取得成長(zhǎng),并享有盈余。兩國(guó)的經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目也享有盈余。
與1997年比較,1998年的新長(zhǎng)期投資項(xiàng)目或外國(guó)直接投資有了增長(zhǎng),是投資者恢復(fù)信心的指標(biāo)。國(guó)際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行和全球多數(shù)的私人企業(yè)分析家都預(yù)測(cè),東亞在1999年或2000年將會(huì)回到正數(shù)增長(zhǎng)。
第三、歷史使我對(duì)亞洲的復(fù)蘇更有信心。1965年,東亞的10個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中只占了9%.10年后的1975年,百分比上升到15%.到了1995年,東亞幾乎與美國(guó)和歐盟平起平坐。那一年,東亞在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中占了25%,而美國(guó)和歐盟的個(gè)別百分比為29%.我相信在東亞取得與美國(guó)和西歐平等經(jīng)濟(jì)地位的歷史過(guò)程中,目前的危機(jī)只不過(guò)是一個(gè)暫時(shí)性的挫折。
從危機(jī)中吸取六個(gè)教訓(xùn)
我要討論的第二個(gè)問(wèn)題是：“我從危機(jī)中學(xué)習(xí)到什么教訓(xùn)？”
我個(gè)人從危機(jī)中學(xué)習(xí)到了六個(gè)教訓(xùn),而這六個(gè)教訓(xùn)是什么呢？
第一、不要利用短期貸款以支付長(zhǎng)期項(xiàng)目。
第二、企業(yè)債務(wù)的總額不能超過(guò)國(guó)家外匯儲(chǔ)備的總額。
第三、不要錯(cuò)誤地分配資金和資源,以免產(chǎn)生資產(chǎn)泡沫式膨脹。
第四、廢除朋黨資本主義,因?yàn)樗o人一種假相,認(rèn)為這些公司都是穩(wěn)健、具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和享有盈余的公司。
第五、除了香港之外,不要將自己的貨幣與一個(gè)主要貨幣（如美元）掛鉤。較好的辦法是和一籃子的貨幣掛鉤,如美元、歐元、日元和其他穩(wěn)定的貨幣。
第六、有規(guī)律和平穩(wěn)地開放資金項(xiàng)目和金融業(yè),以確保強(qiáng)健的金融體系、調(diào)節(jié)系統(tǒng)以及有效率和權(quán)力的監(jiān)管人員,來(lái)抵擋全球資金市場(chǎng)的沖擊力。
六個(gè)關(guān)鍵性的選擇
危機(jī)后的亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)面貌將會(huì)如何？坦白說(shuō),我并不知道。經(jīng)濟(jì)的面貌如何將取決于亞洲會(huì)怎樣面對(duì)六個(gè)關(guān)鍵性的選擇。
是哪六個(gè)關(guān)鍵性的選擇？
第一、我們要廉潔的政府,還是貪污的政府？
第二、我們要透明、對(duì)人民負(fù)責(zé)的政府,還是不透明、不愿對(duì)人民負(fù)責(zé)的政府？
第三、我們要維護(hù)良好的企業(yè)管理方式,還是維持貪污、勾結(jié)、裙帶風(fēng)氣？
第四、我們要采取內(nèi)望策略、施行保護(hù)主義,還是開放經(jīng)濟(jì)給外來(lái)投資、使公司在進(jìn)行合并和收購(gòu)的時(shí)候更加便利？
第五、我們要保護(hù)我們的企業(yè)集團(tuán),還是讓市場(chǎng)力量迫使它們進(jìn)行改組,集中于核心業(yè)務(wù),或者讓那些不具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的企業(yè)關(guān)閉？
第六、我們的政府要建設(shè)一個(gè)全民有份、平等和團(tuán)結(jié)的社會(huì),還是一個(gè)貧富懸殊的社會(huì)？
總結(jié)
我對(duì)亞洲的未來(lái)有信心。有初步跡象顯示,一些受影響的經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)處于復(fù)蘇的過(guò)程中。我希望亞洲能夠把這次的危機(jī)轉(zhuǎn)化成契機(jī),重建自己,矯正錯(cuò)誤的政策和有缺陷的體系。如果亞洲成功地廢除貪污、勾結(jié)、裙帶風(fēng)氣,維護(hù)良好的企業(yè)管理方式,形成透明、對(duì)人民負(fù)責(zé)的政府和產(chǎn)生較有人情味的資本主義,那亞洲就會(huì)有一個(gè)光明的前途。相反的,如果對(duì)這些問(wèn)題都置之不理的話,恐怕亞洲在過(guò)幾年之后又會(huì)再面對(duì)另一個(gè)危機(jī)。選擇就在我們的手中。