英語(yǔ)資源頻道為大家整理的china daily 雙語(yǔ)新聞：央行獨(dú)立未必是好事？，供大家學(xué)習(xí)參考:)
Four years ago, Zoltan Pozsar helped change how policy makers visualise the financial world when he worked with colleagues at the New York Federal Reserve to create a gigantic wall map of shadow banking. Astonishingly, it was the first time anyone had laid out these financial flows in detailed, graphic form. And by doing that, the NY Fed researchers showed why the sector mattered – and why policy makers needed to rethink how the financial ecosystem did (or did not) work.
4年前，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家佐爾坦·鮑茲(Zoltan Pozsar)幫助改變了政策制定者對(duì)金融世界的看法，當(dāng)時(shí)他與紐約聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行(New York Federal Reserve)的同事一起繪制了一張有關(guān)影子銀行的巨幅掛圖。令人吃驚的是，這是第一次有人利用詳細(xì)圖表顯示金融流動(dòng)。通過(guò)這種方式，紐約聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行的研究人員揭示了金融業(yè)存在的重要意義——以及政策制定者需要反思金融生態(tài)系統(tǒng)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)（或失靈）機(jī)制的原因。
Now Pozsar has left the NY Fed and teamed up with Paul McCulley, the former investment luminary of Pimco (and the man who coined that phrase “shadow banking”) to tackle another issue. But this time, it is not securitisation they want to “map” – but “helicopter money”, or quantitative easing.
如今，鮑茲已離開(kāi)紐約聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行，并與太平洋投資管理公司(Pimco)前投資大師（也是“影子銀行”一詞的發(fā)明者）保羅·麥卡利(Paul McCulley)合作，試圖解決另一個(gè)問(wèn)題。但這一次，他們想要“繪制”的地圖并非證券化，而是“直升機(jī)撒錢(qián)”(helicopter money)或者定量寬松(QE)。
For Pozsar and McCulley argue that just as we needed to rethink finance five years ago, we now need to embrace a new mental map of central banks. For while there has been a widespread assumption that central bank independence is always a good thing, they argue, this paradigm does not hold true. “As long as there will be secular debt cycles, central bank independence will be a station, not a final destination,” they insist. And while that assertion will horrify some commentators, the map provides a timely device to stimulate debate; and doubly so given the splits inside the Federal Reserve about the merits of quantitative easing – and the policy dilemma besetting the European Central Bank, as the European economy ails.
鮑茲和麥卡利辯稱，就像5年前需要反思金融一樣，現(xiàn)在我們應(yīng)著手繪制一張新的央行心理地圖。盡管人們普遍認(rèn)定央行保持獨(dú)立性永遠(yuǎn)是件好事，但他們辯稱，這一觀念站不住腳。他們堅(jiān)持表示：“只要存在長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)周期，央行獨(dú)立性將只是一個(gè)站點(diǎn)，而絕非終點(diǎn)站?！彪m然此斷言將讓一些評(píng)論人士感到恐懼，但央行心理地圖會(huì)及時(shí)成為一種引發(fā)辯論的工具；鑒于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)內(nèi)部關(guān)于定量寬松政策優(yōu)點(diǎn)的分歧，以及歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)萎靡不振給歐洲央行(ECB)帶來(lái)的政策難題，它更會(huì)是這樣一種工具了。
The key issue at stake, Pozsar and McCulley argue, is that long-term debt cycles tend to produce diametrically opposed states of the world, in two different fields, which can be plotted as axes on a graph. Sometimes private sector creditors are in a “l(fā)everaging” mode; sometimes they are “deleveraging” instead. So too with public policy: sometimes fiscal policy is restrictive (via austerity); sometimes it is stimulative (ie governments are borrowing).
鮑茲和麥卡利主張，現(xiàn)在關(guān)鍵的問(wèn)題是，長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)周期往往會(huì)對(duì)兩個(gè)不同的領(lǐng)域造成完全相反的效果，這兩個(gè)領(lǐng)域以圖表上的坐標(biāo)軸來(lái)表示。私營(yíng)部門(mén)債權(quán)人有時(shí)處于“杠桿化”狀態(tài)，有時(shí)處于“去杠桿化”狀態(tài)。公共政策也是如此：有時(shí)是限制性財(cái)政政策（通過(guò)緊縮），有時(shí)刺激性財(cái)政政策（即政府在借款）。
If you plot those two factors as two different axes on a chart, you get four quadrants, representing different points in economic history. When public and private activity is stimulative, there is a credit boom (which central banks need to rein in by damping inflation). When you have deleveraging in one sector, the pattern is mixed. But when both the private and public sector are deleveraging, there is often deflation and a liquidity trap: borrowers do not want to borrow, no matter how cheap money becomes, making monetary policy less effective. So, Pozsar and McCulley argue that in this fourth quadrant we need to embrace a mental flip. Instead of considering central bank independence to be a good thing, because it prevents inflation, central banks need to lose that independence, and work under finance ministries instead. Monetary policy and fiscal expansion must both be stimulative, since loose money alone will not work. Thus the central bank needs to monetise the public debt by buying lots of government bonds, say, or take other steps to co-ordinate fiscal and monetary measures.
如果你用圖表上的兩個(gè)不同坐標(biāo)軸分別代表這兩個(gè)因素，你會(huì)看到4個(gè)象限，每個(gè)象限代表著不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)歷史時(shí)期。當(dāng)公共和私營(yíng)部門(mén)活動(dòng)發(fā)揮刺激性作用時(shí)，會(huì)出現(xiàn)信貸熱潮（央行需通過(guò)控制通脹來(lái)抑制這一熱潮）。當(dāng)其中一個(gè)部門(mén)去杠桿化時(shí)，會(huì)出現(xiàn)復(fù)雜的后果。但當(dāng)這兩個(gè)部門(mén)都去杠桿化時(shí)，通常會(huì)出現(xiàn)通縮和流動(dòng)性陷阱：不管資金成本多么低，借款人都不想借入資金，這削弱了貨幣政策的效果。因此，鮑茲和麥卡利辯稱，在這個(gè)第四象限，我們需要轉(zhuǎn)換思維。不要因?yàn)檠胄歇?dú)立性阻止了通脹就把它看成一件好事，相反，央行應(yīng)當(dāng)拋棄那種獨(dú)立性，接受財(cái)政部的政策指導(dǎo)。貨幣政策和財(cái)政擴(kuò)張必須同時(shí)具備刺激效果，因?yàn)閮H靠貨幣寬松達(dá)不到預(yù)期目的。因此，央行應(yīng)購(gòu)買大量政府債券或者采取其他措施，使財(cái)政和貨幣措施協(xié)調(diào)地發(fā)揮作用，將公共債務(wù)貨幣化。
Now a cynic might suggest that some Western central banks have already done this, by accident, if not design; the Fed has been gobbling up treasury bonds. Indeed, in 2003, before becoming Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke himself observed that it is “important to recognise that the role of an independent central bank is different in inflationary and deflationary environments. In the face of inflation?.?.?.?the virtue of an independent central bank is its ability to say “no” to the government. [In private deleveraging cycles], however?.?.?.?greater co-operation for a time between [central banks] and fiscal authorities is in no way inconsistent with the independence of the central banks.”
如今，持懷疑態(tài)度的人可能會(huì)表示，一些西方央行意外做到了這點(diǎn)，如果不是故意而為的話；美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)一直在大量吃進(jìn)國(guó)債。實(shí)際上，在成為美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席之前的2003年，本·伯南克(Ben Bernanke)便評(píng)述道，“重要的是認(rèn)識(shí)到，獨(dú)立央行在通脹和通縮時(shí)期起到的作用是不同的。面對(duì)通脹……獨(dú)立央行的優(yōu)點(diǎn)是它能夠?qū)φf(shuō)‘不’。但（在私營(yíng)部門(mén)去杠桿化周期中）……（央行）和財(cái)政*之間暫時(shí)加大合作力度，與央行獨(dú)立性是完全抵觸的?！?BR> But I doubt that Bernanke would choose such language today; in the current climate, particularly in the US, “monetisation” is a dirty word. Most Western governments are committed to fiscal austerity. And there is so much political fragmentation in the eurozone and the US that it is hard to imagine anybody actually developing a proactive and rational plan to co-ordinate monetary and fiscal policy.
但我懷疑伯南克如今會(huì)選擇這樣的措辭：在當(dāng)前環(huán)境下，尤其是在美國(guó)，“貨幣化”已成為一個(gè)禁忌字眼。多數(shù)西方政府承諾進(jìn)行財(cái)政緊縮。歐元區(qū)與美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的政治分裂如此嚴(yán)重，以致于很難想象有誰(shuí)真能制定一項(xiàng)積極、合理的方案，使貨幣政策與財(cái)政政策協(xié)調(diào)一致地發(fā)揮作用。
As Pozsar and McCulley also show, history provides ample evidence that policy paradigms can sometimes shift. In the years after the second world war, central banks effectively lost their independence, when the West embarked on financial repression. In the interwar years, central banks lost control even more dramatically, as crises hit Germany.
正如鮑茲和麥卡利另外表示的那樣，大量的歷史證據(jù)告訴我們，政策模式有時(shí)可能會(huì)發(fā)生變化。在二戰(zhàn)后的幾年里，央行實(shí)際上喪失了其獨(dú)立性，當(dāng)時(shí)西方實(shí)行了金融抑制政策。在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)期間，當(dāng)危機(jī)席卷德國(guó)之際，央行甚至在更大程度上喪失了控制權(quán)。
We are not in the same place today: the US, say, faces modest inflation, not deflation. But it would be a bold investor who would assume history could never be replayed, if the economic crises grind on. If there is one thing we learnt in the 2008 financial crisis, it is that events which once appeared unimaginable do sometimes occur. In retrospect, the only reason we were surprised by events was that we had a bad (or limited) mental map of how the world worked. Shadow banking was one case in point. It is unlikely to be the last.
我們目前的狀況不同于過(guò)去：例如，美國(guó)正面臨溫和通脹，而非通縮。但如果經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)繼續(xù)下去的話，大膽的投資者才敢于假定歷史不會(huì)重演。如果我們從2008年金融危機(jī)中吸取到了什么教訓(xùn)的話，那就是曾經(jīng)看似無(wú)法想象的事件有時(shí)的確會(huì)發(fā)生?；仡欉^(guò)去，我們對(duì)事態(tài)變化感到意外的原因，是我們手握一張描述世界運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)規(guī)律的一張?jiān)愀猓ɑ虿粔蛉妫┑牡貓D。影子銀行就是一個(gè)很好的例子，但不太可能是最后一例。
Four years ago, Zoltan Pozsar helped change how policy makers visualise the financial world when he worked with colleagues at the New York Federal Reserve to create a gigantic wall map of shadow banking. Astonishingly, it was the first time anyone had laid out these financial flows in detailed, graphic form. And by doing that, the NY Fed researchers showed why the sector mattered – and why policy makers needed to rethink how the financial ecosystem did (or did not) work.
4年前，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家佐爾坦·鮑茲(Zoltan Pozsar)幫助改變了政策制定者對(duì)金融世界的看法，當(dāng)時(shí)他與紐約聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行(New York Federal Reserve)的同事一起繪制了一張有關(guān)影子銀行的巨幅掛圖。令人吃驚的是，這是第一次有人利用詳細(xì)圖表顯示金融流動(dòng)。通過(guò)這種方式，紐約聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行的研究人員揭示了金融業(yè)存在的重要意義——以及政策制定者需要反思金融生態(tài)系統(tǒng)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)（或失靈）機(jī)制的原因。
Now Pozsar has left the NY Fed and teamed up with Paul McCulley, the former investment luminary of Pimco (and the man who coined that phrase “shadow banking”) to tackle another issue. But this time, it is not securitisation they want to “map” – but “helicopter money”, or quantitative easing.
如今，鮑茲已離開(kāi)紐約聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行，并與太平洋投資管理公司(Pimco)前投資大師（也是“影子銀行”一詞的發(fā)明者）保羅·麥卡利(Paul McCulley)合作，試圖解決另一個(gè)問(wèn)題。但這一次，他們想要“繪制”的地圖并非證券化，而是“直升機(jī)撒錢(qián)”(helicopter money)或者定量寬松(QE)。
For Pozsar and McCulley argue that just as we needed to rethink finance five years ago, we now need to embrace a new mental map of central banks. For while there has been a widespread assumption that central bank independence is always a good thing, they argue, this paradigm does not hold true. “As long as there will be secular debt cycles, central bank independence will be a station, not a final destination,” they insist. And while that assertion will horrify some commentators, the map provides a timely device to stimulate debate; and doubly so given the splits inside the Federal Reserve about the merits of quantitative easing – and the policy dilemma besetting the European Central Bank, as the European economy ails.
鮑茲和麥卡利辯稱，就像5年前需要反思金融一樣，現(xiàn)在我們應(yīng)著手繪制一張新的央行心理地圖。盡管人們普遍認(rèn)定央行保持獨(dú)立性永遠(yuǎn)是件好事，但他們辯稱，這一觀念站不住腳。他們堅(jiān)持表示：“只要存在長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)周期，央行獨(dú)立性將只是一個(gè)站點(diǎn)，而絕非終點(diǎn)站?！彪m然此斷言將讓一些評(píng)論人士感到恐懼，但央行心理地圖會(huì)及時(shí)成為一種引發(fā)辯論的工具；鑒于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)內(nèi)部關(guān)于定量寬松政策優(yōu)點(diǎn)的分歧，以及歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)萎靡不振給歐洲央行(ECB)帶來(lái)的政策難題，它更會(huì)是這樣一種工具了。
The key issue at stake, Pozsar and McCulley argue, is that long-term debt cycles tend to produce diametrically opposed states of the world, in two different fields, which can be plotted as axes on a graph. Sometimes private sector creditors are in a “l(fā)everaging” mode; sometimes they are “deleveraging” instead. So too with public policy: sometimes fiscal policy is restrictive (via austerity); sometimes it is stimulative (ie governments are borrowing).
鮑茲和麥卡利主張，現(xiàn)在關(guān)鍵的問(wèn)題是，長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)周期往往會(huì)對(duì)兩個(gè)不同的領(lǐng)域造成完全相反的效果，這兩個(gè)領(lǐng)域以圖表上的坐標(biāo)軸來(lái)表示。私營(yíng)部門(mén)債權(quán)人有時(shí)處于“杠桿化”狀態(tài)，有時(shí)處于“去杠桿化”狀態(tài)。公共政策也是如此：有時(shí)是限制性財(cái)政政策（通過(guò)緊縮），有時(shí)刺激性財(cái)政政策（即政府在借款）。
If you plot those two factors as two different axes on a chart, you get four quadrants, representing different points in economic history. When public and private activity is stimulative, there is a credit boom (which central banks need to rein in by damping inflation). When you have deleveraging in one sector, the pattern is mixed. But when both the private and public sector are deleveraging, there is often deflation and a liquidity trap: borrowers do not want to borrow, no matter how cheap money becomes, making monetary policy less effective. So, Pozsar and McCulley argue that in this fourth quadrant we need to embrace a mental flip. Instead of considering central bank independence to be a good thing, because it prevents inflation, central banks need to lose that independence, and work under finance ministries instead. Monetary policy and fiscal expansion must both be stimulative, since loose money alone will not work. Thus the central bank needs to monetise the public debt by buying lots of government bonds, say, or take other steps to co-ordinate fiscal and monetary measures.
如果你用圖表上的兩個(gè)不同坐標(biāo)軸分別代表這兩個(gè)因素，你會(huì)看到4個(gè)象限，每個(gè)象限代表著不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)歷史時(shí)期。當(dāng)公共和私營(yíng)部門(mén)活動(dòng)發(fā)揮刺激性作用時(shí)，會(huì)出現(xiàn)信貸熱潮（央行需通過(guò)控制通脹來(lái)抑制這一熱潮）。當(dāng)其中一個(gè)部門(mén)去杠桿化時(shí)，會(huì)出現(xiàn)復(fù)雜的后果。但當(dāng)這兩個(gè)部門(mén)都去杠桿化時(shí)，通常會(huì)出現(xiàn)通縮和流動(dòng)性陷阱：不管資金成本多么低，借款人都不想借入資金，這削弱了貨幣政策的效果。因此，鮑茲和麥卡利辯稱，在這個(gè)第四象限，我們需要轉(zhuǎn)換思維。不要因?yàn)檠胄歇?dú)立性阻止了通脹就把它看成一件好事，相反，央行應(yīng)當(dāng)拋棄那種獨(dú)立性，接受財(cái)政部的政策指導(dǎo)。貨幣政策和財(cái)政擴(kuò)張必須同時(shí)具備刺激效果，因?yàn)閮H靠貨幣寬松達(dá)不到預(yù)期目的。因此，央行應(yīng)購(gòu)買大量政府債券或者采取其他措施，使財(cái)政和貨幣措施協(xié)調(diào)地發(fā)揮作用，將公共債務(wù)貨幣化。
Now a cynic might suggest that some Western central banks have already done this, by accident, if not design; the Fed has been gobbling up treasury bonds. Indeed, in 2003, before becoming Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke himself observed that it is “important to recognise that the role of an independent central bank is different in inflationary and deflationary environments. In the face of inflation?.?.?.?the virtue of an independent central bank is its ability to say “no” to the government. [In private deleveraging cycles], however?.?.?.?greater co-operation for a time between [central banks] and fiscal authorities is in no way inconsistent with the independence of the central banks.”
如今，持懷疑態(tài)度的人可能會(huì)表示，一些西方央行意外做到了這點(diǎn)，如果不是故意而為的話；美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)一直在大量吃進(jìn)國(guó)債。實(shí)際上，在成為美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席之前的2003年，本·伯南克(Ben Bernanke)便評(píng)述道，“重要的是認(rèn)識(shí)到，獨(dú)立央行在通脹和通縮時(shí)期起到的作用是不同的。面對(duì)通脹……獨(dú)立央行的優(yōu)點(diǎn)是它能夠?qū)φf(shuō)‘不’。但（在私營(yíng)部門(mén)去杠桿化周期中）……（央行）和財(cái)政*之間暫時(shí)加大合作力度，與央行獨(dú)立性是完全抵觸的?！?BR> But I doubt that Bernanke would choose such language today; in the current climate, particularly in the US, “monetisation” is a dirty word. Most Western governments are committed to fiscal austerity. And there is so much political fragmentation in the eurozone and the US that it is hard to imagine anybody actually developing a proactive and rational plan to co-ordinate monetary and fiscal policy.
但我懷疑伯南克如今會(huì)選擇這樣的措辭：在當(dāng)前環(huán)境下，尤其是在美國(guó)，“貨幣化”已成為一個(gè)禁忌字眼。多數(shù)西方政府承諾進(jìn)行財(cái)政緊縮。歐元區(qū)與美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的政治分裂如此嚴(yán)重，以致于很難想象有誰(shuí)真能制定一項(xiàng)積極、合理的方案，使貨幣政策與財(cái)政政策協(xié)調(diào)一致地發(fā)揮作用。
As Pozsar and McCulley also show, history provides ample evidence that policy paradigms can sometimes shift. In the years after the second world war, central banks effectively lost their independence, when the West embarked on financial repression. In the interwar years, central banks lost control even more dramatically, as crises hit Germany.
正如鮑茲和麥卡利另外表示的那樣，大量的歷史證據(jù)告訴我們，政策模式有時(shí)可能會(huì)發(fā)生變化。在二戰(zhàn)后的幾年里，央行實(shí)際上喪失了其獨(dú)立性，當(dāng)時(shí)西方實(shí)行了金融抑制政策。在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)期間，當(dāng)危機(jī)席卷德國(guó)之際，央行甚至在更大程度上喪失了控制權(quán)。
We are not in the same place today: the US, say, faces modest inflation, not deflation. But it would be a bold investor who would assume history could never be replayed, if the economic crises grind on. If there is one thing we learnt in the 2008 financial crisis, it is that events which once appeared unimaginable do sometimes occur. In retrospect, the only reason we were surprised by events was that we had a bad (or limited) mental map of how the world worked. Shadow banking was one case in point. It is unlikely to be the last.
我們目前的狀況不同于過(guò)去：例如，美國(guó)正面臨溫和通脹，而非通縮。但如果經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)繼續(xù)下去的話，大膽的投資者才敢于假定歷史不會(huì)重演。如果我們從2008年金融危機(jī)中吸取到了什么教訓(xùn)的話，那就是曾經(jīng)看似無(wú)法想象的事件有時(shí)的確會(huì)發(fā)生?；仡欉^(guò)去，我們對(duì)事態(tài)變化感到意外的原因，是我們手握一張描述世界運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)規(guī)律的一張?jiān)愀猓ɑ虿粔蛉妫┑牡貓D。影子銀行就是一個(gè)很好的例子，但不太可能是最后一例。