英語(yǔ)資源頻道為大家整理的china daily 雙語(yǔ)新聞：為大到不能倒開(kāi)藥方，供大家學(xué)習(xí)參考。
Senators from opposite ends of the US political spectrum are finally asking the question that should have been answered before Dodd-Frank became law: how big is “too big to fail”?
美國(guó)政壇對(duì)立的兩派參議員終于問(wèn)到了一個(gè)問(wèn)題：到底多大才算“大到不能倒”？其實(shí)，這是一個(gè)《多德-弗蘭克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)通過(guò)之前就應(yīng)給出答案的問(wèn)題。
Democrat Sherrod Brown and Republican David Vitter have asked the General Accountability Office, the investigative agency of the US Congress, to quantify the subsidy too big to fail banks receive from what are in effect taxpayer guarantees.
民主黨參議員謝羅德·布朗(Sherrod Brown)和共和黨參議員戴維·維特(David Vitter)要求美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)下屬調(diào)查機(jī)構(gòu)美國(guó)審計(jì)總署(GAO)計(jì)算出大到不能倒的銀行得到了多高數(shù)額的補(bǔ)貼，這些補(bǔ)貼實(shí)質(zhì)上來(lái)自于由納稅人擔(dān)保的資金。
The subsidy is the funding advantage that the banks receive because their creditors know they will be made whole in the event of financial stress, just as creditors were during the financial crisis.
這些補(bǔ)貼使銀行獲得了資金上的優(yōu)勢(shì)，令它們的債權(quán)人知道，他們的資金在銀行遭遇金融壓力之時(shí)仍可得到保障，就像債權(quán)人在金融危機(jī)時(shí)期受到的待遇那樣。
The drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act rarely stopped to consider the subsidy. Rather, they tried to prevent the next systemic failure with a fusillade of regulatory weaponry: elevated capital and liquidity standards, living wills, new resolution regimes and highly intrusive regulation. This approach ignores how market discipline is the essential tool in controlling risk-taking. The failure of a business must always be a realistic option.
《多德-弗蘭克法案》的起草人幾乎沒(méi)有停下來(lái)想過(guò)補(bǔ)貼問(wèn)題。相反，他們?cè)噲D動(dòng)用一連串監(jiān)管“武器”來(lái)阻止下一次系統(tǒng)性失靈，這些“武器”包括：提高資本和流動(dòng)性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；讓銀行立下“生前預(yù)囑”；實(shí)行新的決議體制以及高度干涉性的監(jiān)管措施。這一思路忽略了如下事實(shí)：對(duì)于遏制冒險(xiǎn)行為而言，市場(chǎng)約束是一項(xiàng)必不可少的工具。無(wú)論如何，都必須把讓企業(yè)倒閉成為一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)選項(xiàng)。
Based on a growing body of academic literature , we believe the GAO will affirm that the too big to fail subsidy is larger than imagined. Armed with those results, the new 113th US Congress will be in a position to address the unfinished work of Dodd-Frank: systemic risk.
在參閱不斷增加的各類學(xué)術(shù)文獻(xiàn)之后，我們認(rèn)為美國(guó)審計(jì)總署最終能夠確認(rèn)，“大到不能倒”的銀行所得補(bǔ)貼的規(guī)模高于預(yù)期。有了具體數(shù)據(jù)的支持，美國(guó)新上任的第113屆國(guó)會(huì)將有機(jī)會(huì)解決《多德-弗蘭克法案》遺留問(wèn)題——系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題。
There are four ways to return the banks to a state where they are manageable, competitive and, ideally, no longer too big to fail.
有四種辦法可以令銀行回到可控制、有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力并且不再“大到不能倒”（這是最理想的目標(biāo)）的狀態(tài)。
First, they could be broken up. This approach appeals to base instincts. However, when one contemplates how the US would go about this and how disruptive it would be to the financial system and the economy, the solution looks daunting. Add some political horse-trading, and it is downright scary.
首先，可以分拆這些銀行。這是最本能的想法。但一想到美國(guó)如何才能做到這一點(diǎn)，以及會(huì)給整個(gè)金融系統(tǒng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)多大的破壞，這個(gè)解決方案似乎讓人感到畏懼。再考慮到一些政治上的討價(jià)還價(jià)，這一方案簡(jiǎn)直讓人不寒而栗。
Second, the growth of the banks could be capped. This seems to be the US Federal Reserve’s preferred approach, at least according to a recent speech by Fed board member Daniel Tarullo. Caps have visceral appeal but they are arbitrary and perpetuate the problem. Besides, do we really want our largest financial institutions, controlling more than 50 per cent of the financial system, operating in a no-growth mode?
其次，可以限制銀行的發(fā)展規(guī)模。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Federal Reserve)看來(lái)似乎更青睞于這個(gè)思路，至少美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)理事丹尼爾·塔魯洛(Daniel Tarullo)最近一次講話給人以這樣的印象。對(duì)銀行發(fā)展規(guī)模設(shè)限乍看上去頗有吸引力，但上限的設(shè)定很武斷，而且使問(wèn)題永遠(yuǎn)得不到解決。此外，我們真的希望令在整個(gè)金融體系中占據(jù)半壁江山以上的大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)以零增長(zhǎng)的模式運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)么？
Third, the banks could be required to issue, at least annually, unsecured long-term senior and subordinated debt. Regulators could be prohibited from protecting these creditors in the event of a bank’s insolvency. If these banks’ total equity and long-term debt is set at 20 per cent of assets, it is highly unlikely that taxpayers would incur losses upon failure. Moreover, the discipline imposed by long-term creditors will curb risk-taking and make failure much less likely.
再者，可以要求銀行每年至少發(fā)放一次無(wú)抵押的長(zhǎng)期優(yōu)先債和次級(jí)債。當(dāng)銀行資不抵債時(shí)，可以禁止監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)保護(hù)這些債務(wù)的債權(quán)人。如果這些銀行的總股本和長(zhǎng)期債被設(shè)定為總資產(chǎn)的20%，銀行倒閉時(shí)納稅人基本上不太可能蒙受什么損失。此外，來(lái)自長(zhǎng)期債權(quán)人的約束將抑制銀行的冒險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)，從而大幅降低倒閉的可能性。
The fourth is a proposal we call the Subsidy Reserve Plan, which relies on market discipline rather than government intervention.
最后一個(gè)辦法是被稱為“補(bǔ)貼儲(chǔ)備計(jì)劃”(Subsidy Reserve Plan)的方案，這一方案依賴于市場(chǎng)約束而不是政府干預(yù)。
It would require each bank to establish a “subsidy reserve” line item on its balance sheet and add to it each year the estimated subsidy it receives from taxpayers in the form of reduced funding costs. The estimate would come from the GAO or the new Office for Financial Research. The reserve would not be considered part of the bank’s capital for regulatory purposes but would be available to protect creditors and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the event of failure.
此方案要求每家銀行在其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中建立一個(gè)“補(bǔ)貼儲(chǔ)備”科目，每年銀行將少付出的融資成本的估值作為收到的納稅人補(bǔ)貼計(jì)在該科目之下。這一估值可以由美國(guó)審計(jì)總署或新成立的金融研究辦公室(Office for Financial Research)來(lái)測(cè)算。出于監(jiān)管的目的，這一儲(chǔ)備不應(yīng)視作銀行資本的一部分，不過(guò)在銀行倒閉時(shí)，這一儲(chǔ)備可以用來(lái)保護(hù)債權(quán)人和美國(guó)聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司(FDIC)。
The reserve would accrue year after year and could be distributed to shareholders only in proportion to a bank’s shrinkage via asset sales, divestitures or spin-offs. It could not be used for dividends, share buybacks or bonuses. If the bank shrank to a size such that it was no longer perceived as too big to fail, the subsidy reserve would end.
這一儲(chǔ)備會(huì)逐年不斷增長(zhǎng)，但是只有在銀行因資產(chǎn)出售、剝離或者分拆導(dǎo)致自身規(guī)模縮減時(shí)，才能根據(jù)縮減程度按比例分給股東。這部分儲(chǔ)備不能用于分紅、回購(gòu)股票或者發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金。如果銀行規(guī)模縮減到不再被視為“大到不能倒”的程度，就可以終止這一補(bǔ)貼儲(chǔ)備制度。
Over time, the reserve would accumulate such that it would be shareholders – not regulators or politicians – that would demand the shrinking of the bank. This is market discipline in its purest form.
隨著時(shí)間的推移，當(dāng)補(bǔ)貼儲(chǔ)備增加到一定規(guī)模，股東（不是監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)，也不是政客）就會(huì)要求銀行縮減規(guī)模。這就是純粹的市場(chǎng)約束。
We want financial companies to grow just as we want the economy to grow. But when they are so large or complex that the country cannot allow them to fail, the US needs to chart a different course. While awaiting the GAO’s findings, surely the US should be planning to resolve the too big to fail problem that still plagues its financial system.
我們希望金融企業(yè)不斷成長(zhǎng)，就像我們希望經(jīng)濟(jì)不斷增長(zhǎng)一樣。但如果金融企業(yè)龐大或者復(fù)雜到其倒閉后果令美國(guó)無(wú)法承受的地步，那么美國(guó)就應(yīng)該采取不同的應(yīng)對(duì)辦法。美國(guó)審計(jì)總署的研究結(jié)果還沒(méi)有出來(lái)，不過(guò)美國(guó)的確應(yīng)該想辦法解決“大到不能倒”的問(wèn)題，因?yàn)樗栽趥χ绹?guó)金融系統(tǒng)。
The writers are, respectively, chairman of Fifth Third Bancorp and a former chairman of the FDIC; and director of the Boston University Center for Finance, Law and Policy
本文兩位作者一位是Fifth Third Bancorp董事長(zhǎng)、美國(guó)聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司(FDIC)前董事長(zhǎng)，另一位是波士頓大學(xué)(Boston University)金融法律與政策研究中心(Center for Finance, Law and Policy)主任
Senators from opposite ends of the US political spectrum are finally asking the question that should have been answered before Dodd-Frank became law: how big is “too big to fail”?
美國(guó)政壇對(duì)立的兩派參議員終于問(wèn)到了一個(gè)問(wèn)題：到底多大才算“大到不能倒”？其實(shí)，這是一個(gè)《多德-弗蘭克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)通過(guò)之前就應(yīng)給出答案的問(wèn)題。
Democrat Sherrod Brown and Republican David Vitter have asked the General Accountability Office, the investigative agency of the US Congress, to quantify the subsidy too big to fail banks receive from what are in effect taxpayer guarantees.
民主黨參議員謝羅德·布朗(Sherrod Brown)和共和黨參議員戴維·維特(David Vitter)要求美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)下屬調(diào)查機(jī)構(gòu)美國(guó)審計(jì)總署(GAO)計(jì)算出大到不能倒的銀行得到了多高數(shù)額的補(bǔ)貼，這些補(bǔ)貼實(shí)質(zhì)上來(lái)自于由納稅人擔(dān)保的資金。
The subsidy is the funding advantage that the banks receive because their creditors know they will be made whole in the event of financial stress, just as creditors were during the financial crisis.
這些補(bǔ)貼使銀行獲得了資金上的優(yōu)勢(shì)，令它們的債權(quán)人知道，他們的資金在銀行遭遇金融壓力之時(shí)仍可得到保障，就像債權(quán)人在金融危機(jī)時(shí)期受到的待遇那樣。
The drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act rarely stopped to consider the subsidy. Rather, they tried to prevent the next systemic failure with a fusillade of regulatory weaponry: elevated capital and liquidity standards, living wills, new resolution regimes and highly intrusive regulation. This approach ignores how market discipline is the essential tool in controlling risk-taking. The failure of a business must always be a realistic option.
《多德-弗蘭克法案》的起草人幾乎沒(méi)有停下來(lái)想過(guò)補(bǔ)貼問(wèn)題。相反，他們?cè)噲D動(dòng)用一連串監(jiān)管“武器”來(lái)阻止下一次系統(tǒng)性失靈，這些“武器”包括：提高資本和流動(dòng)性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；讓銀行立下“生前預(yù)囑”；實(shí)行新的決議體制以及高度干涉性的監(jiān)管措施。這一思路忽略了如下事實(shí)：對(duì)于遏制冒險(xiǎn)行為而言，市場(chǎng)約束是一項(xiàng)必不可少的工具。無(wú)論如何，都必須把讓企業(yè)倒閉成為一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)選項(xiàng)。
Based on a growing body of academic literature , we believe the GAO will affirm that the too big to fail subsidy is larger than imagined. Armed with those results, the new 113th US Congress will be in a position to address the unfinished work of Dodd-Frank: systemic risk.
在參閱不斷增加的各類學(xué)術(shù)文獻(xiàn)之后，我們認(rèn)為美國(guó)審計(jì)總署最終能夠確認(rèn)，“大到不能倒”的銀行所得補(bǔ)貼的規(guī)模高于預(yù)期。有了具體數(shù)據(jù)的支持，美國(guó)新上任的第113屆國(guó)會(huì)將有機(jī)會(huì)解決《多德-弗蘭克法案》遺留問(wèn)題——系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題。
There are four ways to return the banks to a state where they are manageable, competitive and, ideally, no longer too big to fail.
有四種辦法可以令銀行回到可控制、有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力并且不再“大到不能倒”（這是最理想的目標(biāo)）的狀態(tài)。
First, they could be broken up. This approach appeals to base instincts. However, when one contemplates how the US would go about this and how disruptive it would be to the financial system and the economy, the solution looks daunting. Add some political horse-trading, and it is downright scary.
首先，可以分拆這些銀行。這是最本能的想法。但一想到美國(guó)如何才能做到這一點(diǎn)，以及會(huì)給整個(gè)金融系統(tǒng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)多大的破壞，這個(gè)解決方案似乎讓人感到畏懼。再考慮到一些政治上的討價(jià)還價(jià)，這一方案簡(jiǎn)直讓人不寒而栗。
Second, the growth of the banks could be capped. This seems to be the US Federal Reserve’s preferred approach, at least according to a recent speech by Fed board member Daniel Tarullo. Caps have visceral appeal but they are arbitrary and perpetuate the problem. Besides, do we really want our largest financial institutions, controlling more than 50 per cent of the financial system, operating in a no-growth mode?
其次，可以限制銀行的發(fā)展規(guī)模。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Federal Reserve)看來(lái)似乎更青睞于這個(gè)思路，至少美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)理事丹尼爾·塔魯洛(Daniel Tarullo)最近一次講話給人以這樣的印象。對(duì)銀行發(fā)展規(guī)模設(shè)限乍看上去頗有吸引力，但上限的設(shè)定很武斷，而且使問(wèn)題永遠(yuǎn)得不到解決。此外，我們真的希望令在整個(gè)金融體系中占據(jù)半壁江山以上的大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)以零增長(zhǎng)的模式運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)么？
Third, the banks could be required to issue, at least annually, unsecured long-term senior and subordinated debt. Regulators could be prohibited from protecting these creditors in the event of a bank’s insolvency. If these banks’ total equity and long-term debt is set at 20 per cent of assets, it is highly unlikely that taxpayers would incur losses upon failure. Moreover, the discipline imposed by long-term creditors will curb risk-taking and make failure much less likely.
再者，可以要求銀行每年至少發(fā)放一次無(wú)抵押的長(zhǎng)期優(yōu)先債和次級(jí)債。當(dāng)銀行資不抵債時(shí)，可以禁止監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)保護(hù)這些債務(wù)的債權(quán)人。如果這些銀行的總股本和長(zhǎng)期債被設(shè)定為總資產(chǎn)的20%，銀行倒閉時(shí)納稅人基本上不太可能蒙受什么損失。此外，來(lái)自長(zhǎng)期債權(quán)人的約束將抑制銀行的冒險(xiǎn)活動(dòng)，從而大幅降低倒閉的可能性。
The fourth is a proposal we call the Subsidy Reserve Plan, which relies on market discipline rather than government intervention.
最后一個(gè)辦法是被稱為“補(bǔ)貼儲(chǔ)備計(jì)劃”(Subsidy Reserve Plan)的方案，這一方案依賴于市場(chǎng)約束而不是政府干預(yù)。
It would require each bank to establish a “subsidy reserve” line item on its balance sheet and add to it each year the estimated subsidy it receives from taxpayers in the form of reduced funding costs. The estimate would come from the GAO or the new Office for Financial Research. The reserve would not be considered part of the bank’s capital for regulatory purposes but would be available to protect creditors and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the event of failure.
此方案要求每家銀行在其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中建立一個(gè)“補(bǔ)貼儲(chǔ)備”科目，每年銀行將少付出的融資成本的估值作為收到的納稅人補(bǔ)貼計(jì)在該科目之下。這一估值可以由美國(guó)審計(jì)總署或新成立的金融研究辦公室(Office for Financial Research)來(lái)測(cè)算。出于監(jiān)管的目的，這一儲(chǔ)備不應(yīng)視作銀行資本的一部分，不過(guò)在銀行倒閉時(shí)，這一儲(chǔ)備可以用來(lái)保護(hù)債權(quán)人和美國(guó)聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司(FDIC)。
The reserve would accrue year after year and could be distributed to shareholders only in proportion to a bank’s shrinkage via asset sales, divestitures or spin-offs. It could not be used for dividends, share buybacks or bonuses. If the bank shrank to a size such that it was no longer perceived as too big to fail, the subsidy reserve would end.
這一儲(chǔ)備會(huì)逐年不斷增長(zhǎng)，但是只有在銀行因資產(chǎn)出售、剝離或者分拆導(dǎo)致自身規(guī)模縮減時(shí)，才能根據(jù)縮減程度按比例分給股東。這部分儲(chǔ)備不能用于分紅、回購(gòu)股票或者發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金。如果銀行規(guī)模縮減到不再被視為“大到不能倒”的程度，就可以終止這一補(bǔ)貼儲(chǔ)備制度。
Over time, the reserve would accumulate such that it would be shareholders – not regulators or politicians – that would demand the shrinking of the bank. This is market discipline in its purest form.
隨著時(shí)間的推移，當(dāng)補(bǔ)貼儲(chǔ)備增加到一定規(guī)模，股東（不是監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)，也不是政客）就會(huì)要求銀行縮減規(guī)模。這就是純粹的市場(chǎng)約束。
We want financial companies to grow just as we want the economy to grow. But when they are so large or complex that the country cannot allow them to fail, the US needs to chart a different course. While awaiting the GAO’s findings, surely the US should be planning to resolve the too big to fail problem that still plagues its financial system.
我們希望金融企業(yè)不斷成長(zhǎng)，就像我們希望經(jīng)濟(jì)不斷增長(zhǎng)一樣。但如果金融企業(yè)龐大或者復(fù)雜到其倒閉后果令美國(guó)無(wú)法承受的地步，那么美國(guó)就應(yīng)該采取不同的應(yīng)對(duì)辦法。美國(guó)審計(jì)總署的研究結(jié)果還沒(méi)有出來(lái)，不過(guò)美國(guó)的確應(yīng)該想辦法解決“大到不能倒”的問(wèn)題，因?yàn)樗栽趥χ绹?guó)金融系統(tǒng)。
The writers are, respectively, chairman of Fifth Third Bancorp and a former chairman of the FDIC; and director of the Boston University Center for Finance, Law and Policy
本文兩位作者一位是Fifth Third Bancorp董事長(zhǎng)、美國(guó)聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司(FDIC)前董事長(zhǎng)，另一位是波士頓大學(xué)(Boston University)金融法律與政策研究中心(Center for Finance, Law and Policy)主任